Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation

[Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 07/13/2015 03:04 PM, Paul Durrant wrote:
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:xen-devel-
>> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Paul Durrant
>> Sent: 13 July 2015 11:12
>> To: Razvan Cojocaru; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich
>> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>>> Sent: 13 July 2015 10:42
>>> To: Paul Durrant; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich
>>> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
>>>
>>> On 07/13/2015 12:05 PM, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>>>>> Sent: 13 July 2015 10:03
>>>>> To: Paul Durrant; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich
>>>>> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with
>>> emulation
>>>>>
>>>>> On 07/13/2015 12:01 PM, Paul Durrant wrote:
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>>>>>>> Sent: 13 July 2015 09:50
>>>>>>> To: Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>>> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich; Paul Durrant
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 07/13/2015 11:10 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 13/07/2015 08:48, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'm battling the following hypervisor crash with current staging:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> (d2) Invoking ROMBIOS ...
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) stdvga.c:147:d2v0 entering stdvga and caching modes
>>>>>>>>> (d2) VGABios $Id: vgabios.c,v 1.67 2008/01/27 09:44:12 vruppert
>> Exp
>>> $
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) Watchdog timer detects that CPU7 is stuck!
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable  x86_64  debug=y  Not tainted ]----
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) CPU:    7
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000202   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d2v0)
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) rax: 000000000000c11d   rbx: ffff83041e687970   rcx:
>>>>>>> 000000000000c11e
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) rdx: ffff83041e687970   rsi: 000000000000c11e   rdi:
>>>>> ffff83041e687978
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) rbp: ffff83040eb37208   rsp: ffff83040eb37200   r8:
>>>>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) r9:  0000000000000000   r10: ffff82d08028c3c0   r11:
>>>>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) r12: ffff83041e687000   r13: ffff83041e687970   r14:
>>>>> ffff83040eb37278
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) r15: 00000000000c253f   cr0: 000000008005003b   cr4:
>>>>>>> 00000000001526e0
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) cr3: 00000004054a0000   cr2: 0000000000000000
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: 0000   cs: e008
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83040eb37200:
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37278 ffff83040eb37238 ffff82d0801d09b6
>>>>>>> 0000000000000282
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000008 ffff830403791bf0 ffff83041e687000
>>>>>>> ffff83040eb37268
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb23a 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000
>>>>>>> 0000000000000001
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    00000000000000c2 ffff83040eb37298 ffff82d0801cb410
>>>>>>> 00000000000c253f
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0100000000000000
>>>>>>> ffff83040eb37328
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801c2403 ffff83040eb37394 ffff83040eb30000
>>>>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37360 00000000000000c2 ffff8304054cb000
>>>>>>> 000000000000053f
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb373f4
>>>>>>> 00000000000000c2
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
>>>>>>> ffff82d08028c620
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37338 ffff82d0801c3e5d
>>>>>>> ffff83040eb37398
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb107 000000010eb37394 ffff830403791bf0
>>>>>>> ffff830403791bf0
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff83041e687000 ffff83040eb37398 ffff830403791bf0
>>>>>>> 0000000000000001
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000001 00000000000c253f
>>>>>>> ffff83040eb373c8
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb291 ffff83040eb37b30 ffff8300d85fc000
>>>>>>> 0000000000000001
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37428 ffff82d0801bb440
>>>>>>> 00000000000a0001
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    00000000000c253f 0000000100000001 0111000000000000
>>>>>>> ffff83040eb37478
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
>>>>>>> 0000000000000001
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    0000000000000001 ffff83040eb374a8 ffff82d0801bc0b9
>>>>>>> 0000000000000001
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 00000000000a0001
>>>>>>> 0100000000000000
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37728 ffff82e00819dc60 0000000000000000
>>>>>>> ffff83040eb374c8
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) Xen call trace:
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801d09b6>] stdvga_mem_accept+0x3b/0x125
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb23a>] hvm_find_io_handler+0x68/0x8a
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb410>] hvm_mmio_internal+0x37/0x67
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c2403>] __hvm_copy+0xe9/0x37d
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c3e5d>]
>>> hvm_copy_from_guest_phys+0x14/0x16
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb107>]
>>> hvm_process_io_intercept+0x10b/0x1d6
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb291>] hvm_io_intercept+0x35/0x5b
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bb440>] hvmemul_do_io+0x1ff/0x2c1
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc0b9>] hvmemul_do_io_addr+0x117/0x163
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc129>]
>> hvmemul_do_mmio_addr+0x24/0x26
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bcbb5>] hvmemul_rep_movs+0x1ef/0x335
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d080198b49>] x86_emulate+0x56c9/0x13088
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bbd26>] _hvm_emulate_one+0x186/0x281
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc1e8>] hvm_emulate_one+0x10/0x12
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb63e>] handle_mmio+0x54/0xd2
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb700>]
>>>>> handle_mmio_with_translation+0x44/0x46
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c27f6>]
>>>>> hvm_hap_nested_page_fault+0x15f/0x589
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801e9741>]
>> vmx_vmexit_handler+0x150e/0x188d
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801ee7d1>]
>> vmx_asm_vmexit_handler+0x41/0xc0
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)
>>>>>>>>> (XEN)
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) ****************************************
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) Panic on CPU 7:
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) FATAL TRAP: vector = 2 (nmi)
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) [error_code=0000]
>>>>>>>>> (XEN) ****************************************
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> At first I thought it was caused by V5 of the vm_event-based
>>>>>>>>> introspection series, but I've rolled it back enough to apply V4 on
>> top
>>>>>>>>> of it (which has been thoroughly tested on Thursday), and it still
>>>>>>>>> happens, so this would at least appear to be unrelated at this point
>>>>>>>>> (other than the fact that our use case is maybe somewhat unusual
>>> with
>>>>>>>>> heavy emulation).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'll keep digging, but since this is a busy time for Xen I thought I'd
>>>>>>>>> issue a heads-up here as soon as possible, in case the problem is
>>>>>>>>> obvious for somebody and it helps getting it fixed sooner.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In c/s 3bbaaec09b1b942f5624dee176da6e416d31f982 there is now a
>>>>>>>> deliberate split between stdvga_mem_accept() and
>>>>>>> stdvga_mem_complete()
>>>>>>>> about locking and unlocking the stdvga lock.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> At a guess, the previous chain of execution accidentally omitted the
>>>>>>>> stdvga_mem_complete() call.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks, I've reverted that patch and the crash is gone. I'll be happy to
>>>>>>> test a fix if one is provided, but I don't know enough about that code
>>>>>>> to go mess with it...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The problem appears to be that __hvm_copy() is calling this code
>> before
>>>>> establishing the type of the page:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>         /*
>>>>>>          * No need to do the P2M lookup for internally handled MMIO,
>>>>> benefiting
>>>>>>          * - 32-bit WinXP (& older Windows) on AMD CPUs for LAPIC
>>> accesses,
>>>>>>          * - newer Windows (like Server 2012) for HPET accesses.
>>>>>>          */
>>>>>>         if ( !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(curr)
>>>>>>              && is_hvm_vcpu(curr)
>>>>>>              && hvm_mmio_internal(gpa) )
>>>>>>             return HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...and that call to hvm_mmio_internal is trying to re-acquire the lock.
>> The
>>>>> big question is why on earth was I not hitting this every time in testing
>>> too...
>>>>> This patch series has gone through some pretty rigorous tests. Anyway,
>> I
>>> will
>>>>> post a fix very shortly (since I know what needs to be done).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   Paul
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks Paul! I appreciate the quick response.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> While I'm prepping, try this:
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c
>>>> index ebb3b42..08c797c 100644
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c
>>>> @@ -490,11 +490,18 @@ static bool_t stdvga_mem_accept(const struct
>>> hvm_io_handle
>>>>  {
>>>>      struct hvm_hw_stdvga *s = &current->domain-
>>>> arch.hvm_domain.stdvga;
>>>>
>>>> +    /*
>>>> +     * The range check must be done without taking any locks, to avoid
>>>> +     * deadlock when hvm_mmio_internal() is called from
>>>> +     * hvm_copy_to/from_guest_phys() in hvm_process_io_intercept().
>>>> +     */
>>>> +    if ( (hvm_mmio_first_byte(p) < VGA_MEM_BASE) ||
>>>> +         (hvm_mmio_last_byte(p) >= (VGA_MEM_BASE +
>> VGA_MEM_SIZE))
>>> )
>>>> +        return 0;
>>>> +
>>>>      spin_lock(&s->lock);
>>>>
>>>> -    if ( !s->stdvga ||
>>>> -         (hvm_mmio_first_byte(p) < VGA_MEM_BASE) ||
>>>> -         (hvm_mmio_last_byte(p) >= (VGA_MEM_BASE +
>> VGA_MEM_SIZE)) )
>>>> +    if ( !s->stdvga )
>>>>          goto reject;
>>>>
>>>>      if ( p->dir == IOREQ_WRITE && p->count > 1 )
>>>
>>> The crash is gone, so in that respect:
>>>
>>> Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>
>>> But my guest seems stuck at boot for some reason, the last line of xl
>>> dmesg is:
>>>
>>> (XEN) stdvga.c:151:d3v0 leaving stdvga mode
>>>
>>> and this is the guest state:
>>>
>>> # ./xenctx -a 3
>>> rip: fffff80001497de0
>>> flags: 00000002 nz
>>> rsp: fffff80001479538
>>> rax: 0000000000000000   rcx: 00000000000003fe   rdx: 00000000000003fe
>>> rbx: fffff8000149a110   rsi: fffff80001479601   rdi: 0000000000009860
>>> rbp: 0000000000000000    r8: fffff8000149a174    r9: 0000000000000000
>>> r10: 00000000000027d7   r11: fffff800014795a0   r12: 0000000000000000
>>> r13: 0000000000000004   r14: 0000000000000002   r15: 0000000000000000
>>>  cs: 0010        ss: 0018        ds: 002b        es: 002b
>>>  fs: 0053 @ 0000000000000000
>>>  gs: 002b @ fffff80001805d00/fffff80001805d00
>>>
>>> cr0: 0000000080050031
>>> cr2: 0000000000000030
>>> cr3: 0000000000187000
>>> cr4: 00000000000006b8
>>>
>>> dr0: 0000000000000000
>>> dr1: 0000000000000000
>>> dr2: 0000000000000000
>>> dr3: 0000000000000000
>>> dr6: 00000000fffe0ff0
>>> dr7: 0000000000000400
>>> Code (instr addr fffff80001497de0)
>>> 90 8a c2 0f b7 d1 ee c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f b7 d1 ec <c3> 90
>>> 90 90 90 90 90 90 88 11 f0
>>>
>>> But it's too early to tell that this isn't something my V5 code is now
>>> doing, so I'll come back if it turns out to be unrelated.
>>>
>>
>> I'm setting up my test rig again now.
> 
> I've not been able to repro so far. I'm using Windows 7 32-bit installation 
> from ISO + cirrus VGA + ROMBIOS + shadow paging, which usually hits emulation 
> pretty hard.

Thanks Paul! I don't want to waste your time since this could very well
be something on my end. I'll investigate more and come back when I have
something more concrete.


Thanks,
Razvan

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel