[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
> -----Original Message----- > From: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:xen-devel- > bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Paul Durrant > Sent: 13 July 2015 11:12 > To: Razvan Cojocaru; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > > Sent: 13 July 2015 10:42 > > To: Paul Durrant; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich > > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation > > > > On 07/13/2015 12:05 PM, Paul Durrant wrote: > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > > >> Sent: 13 July 2015 10:03 > > >> To: Paul Durrant; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > >> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich > > >> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with > > emulation > > >> > > >> On 07/13/2015 12:01 PM, Paul Durrant wrote: > > >>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > > >>>> Sent: 13 July 2015 09:50 > > >>>> To: Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > >>>> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich; Paul Durrant > > >>>> Subject: Re: Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation > > >>>> > > >>>> On 07/13/2015 11:10 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > >>>>> On 13/07/2015 08:48, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: > > >>>>>> Hello, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> I'm battling the following hypervisor crash with current staging: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (d2) Invoking ROMBIOS ... > > >>>>>> (XEN) stdvga.c:147:d2v0 entering stdvga and caching modes > > >>>>>> (d2) VGABios $Id: vgabios.c,v 1.67 2008/01/27 09:44:12 vruppert > Exp > > $ > > >>>>>> (XEN) Watchdog timer detects that CPU7 is stuck! > > >>>>>> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- > > >>>>>> (XEN) CPU: 7 > > >>>>>> (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54 > > >>>>>> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000202 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d2v0) > > >>>>>> (XEN) rax: 000000000000c11d rbx: ffff83041e687970 rcx: > > >>>> 000000000000c11e > > >>>>>> (XEN) rdx: ffff83041e687970 rsi: 000000000000c11e rdi: > > >> ffff83041e687978 > > >>>>>> (XEN) rbp: ffff83040eb37208 rsp: ffff83040eb37200 r8: > > >>>> 0000000000000000 > > >>>>>> (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: ffff82d08028c3c0 r11: > > >>>> 0000000000000000 > > >>>>>> (XEN) r12: ffff83041e687000 r13: ffff83041e687970 r14: > > >> ffff83040eb37278 > > >>>>>> (XEN) r15: 00000000000c253f cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: > > >>>> 00000000001526e0 > > >>>>>> (XEN) cr3: 00000004054a0000 cr2: 0000000000000000 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 > > >>>>>> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83040eb37200: > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb37278 ffff83040eb37238 ffff82d0801d09b6 > > >>>> 0000000000000282 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000008 ffff830403791bf0 ffff83041e687000 > > >>>> ffff83040eb37268 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801cb23a 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 > > >>>> 0000000000000001 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 00000000000000c2 ffff83040eb37298 ffff82d0801cb410 > > >>>> 00000000000c253f > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0100000000000000 > > >>>> ffff83040eb37328 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801c2403 ffff83040eb37394 ffff83040eb30000 > > >>>> 0000000000000000 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb37360 00000000000000c2 ffff8304054cb000 > > >>>> 000000000000053f > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb373f4 > > >>>> 00000000000000c2 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > > >>>> ffff82d08028c620 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37338 ffff82d0801c3e5d > > >>>> ffff83040eb37398 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801cb107 000000010eb37394 ffff830403791bf0 > > >>>> ffff830403791bf0 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff83041e687000 ffff83040eb37398 ffff830403791bf0 > > >>>> 0000000000000001 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000001 00000000000c253f > > >>>> ffff83040eb373c8 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801cb291 ffff83040eb37b30 ffff8300d85fc000 > > >>>> 0000000000000001 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37428 ffff82d0801bb440 > > >>>> 00000000000a0001 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 00000000000c253f 0000000100000001 0111000000000000 > > >>>> ffff83040eb37478 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > > >>>> 0000000000000001 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 0000000000000001 ffff83040eb374a8 ffff82d0801bc0b9 > > >>>> 0000000000000001 > > >>>>>> (XEN) 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 00000000000a0001 > > >>>> 0100000000000000 > > >>>>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb37728 ffff82e00819dc60 0000000000000000 > > >>>> ffff83040eb374c8 > > >>>>>> (XEN) Xen call trace: > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801d09b6>] stdvga_mem_accept+0x3b/0x125 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb23a>] hvm_find_io_handler+0x68/0x8a > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb410>] hvm_mmio_internal+0x37/0x67 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c2403>] __hvm_copy+0xe9/0x37d > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c3e5d>] > > hvm_copy_from_guest_phys+0x14/0x16 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb107>] > > hvm_process_io_intercept+0x10b/0x1d6 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb291>] hvm_io_intercept+0x35/0x5b > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bb440>] hvmemul_do_io+0x1ff/0x2c1 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bc0b9>] hvmemul_do_io_addr+0x117/0x163 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bc129>] > hvmemul_do_mmio_addr+0x24/0x26 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bcbb5>] hvmemul_rep_movs+0x1ef/0x335 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d080198b49>] x86_emulate+0x56c9/0x13088 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bbd26>] _hvm_emulate_one+0x186/0x281 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bc1e8>] hvm_emulate_one+0x10/0x12 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb63e>] handle_mmio+0x54/0xd2 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb700>] > > >> handle_mmio_with_translation+0x44/0x46 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c27f6>] > > >> hvm_hap_nested_page_fault+0x15f/0x589 > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e9741>] > vmx_vmexit_handler+0x150e/0x188d > > >>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801ee7d1>] > vmx_asm_vmexit_handler+0x41/0xc0 > > >>>>>> (XEN) > > >>>>>> (XEN) > > >>>>>> (XEN) **************************************** > > >>>>>> (XEN) Panic on CPU 7: > > >>>>>> (XEN) FATAL TRAP: vector = 2 (nmi) > > >>>>>> (XEN) [error_code=0000] > > >>>>>> (XEN) **************************************** > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> At first I thought it was caused by V5 of the vm_event-based > > >>>>>> introspection series, but I've rolled it back enough to apply V4 on > top > > >>>>>> of it (which has been thoroughly tested on Thursday), and it still > > >>>>>> happens, so this would at least appear to be unrelated at this point > > >>>>>> (other than the fact that our use case is maybe somewhat unusual > > with > > >>>>>> heavy emulation). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> I'll keep digging, but since this is a busy time for Xen I thought > > >>>>>> I'd > > >>>>>> issue a heads-up here as soon as possible, in case the problem is > > >>>>>> obvious for somebody and it helps getting it fixed sooner. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> In c/s 3bbaaec09b1b942f5624dee176da6e416d31f982 there is now a > > >>>>> deliberate split between stdvga_mem_accept() and > > >>>> stdvga_mem_complete() > > >>>>> about locking and unlocking the stdvga lock. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> At a guess, the previous chain of execution accidentally omitted the > > >>>>> stdvga_mem_complete() call. > > >>>> > > >>>> Thanks, I've reverted that patch and the crash is gone. I'll be happy > > >>>> to > > >>>> test a fix if one is provided, but I don't know enough about that code > > >>>> to go mess with it... > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> The problem appears to be that __hvm_copy() is calling this code > before > > >> establishing the type of the page: > > >>> > > >>> /* > > >>> * No need to do the P2M lookup for internally handled MMIO, > > >> benefiting > > >>> * - 32-bit WinXP (& older Windows) on AMD CPUs for LAPIC > > accesses, > > >>> * - newer Windows (like Server 2012) for HPET accesses. > > >>> */ > > >>> if ( !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(curr) > > >>> && is_hvm_vcpu(curr) > > >>> && hvm_mmio_internal(gpa) ) > > >>> return HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn; > > >>> > > >>> ...and that call to hvm_mmio_internal is trying to re-acquire the lock. > The > > >> big question is why on earth was I not hitting this every time in testing > > too... > > >> This patch series has gone through some pretty rigorous tests. Anyway, > I > > will > > >> post a fix very shortly (since I know what needs to be done). > > >>> > > >>> Paul > > >> > > >> Thanks Paul! I appreciate the quick response. > > >> > > > > > > While I'm prepping, try this: > > > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c > > > index ebb3b42..08c797c 100644 > > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c > > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c > > > @@ -490,11 +490,18 @@ static bool_t stdvga_mem_accept(const struct > > hvm_io_handle > > > { > > > struct hvm_hw_stdvga *s = ¤t->domain- > > >arch.hvm_domain.stdvga; > > > > > > + /* > > > + * The range check must be done without taking any locks, to avoid > > > + * deadlock when hvm_mmio_internal() is called from > > > + * hvm_copy_to/from_guest_phys() in hvm_process_io_intercept(). > > > + */ > > > + if ( (hvm_mmio_first_byte(p) < VGA_MEM_BASE) || > > > + (hvm_mmio_last_byte(p) >= (VGA_MEM_BASE + > VGA_MEM_SIZE)) > > ) > > > + return 0; > > > + > > > spin_lock(&s->lock); > > > > > > - if ( !s->stdvga || > > > - (hvm_mmio_first_byte(p) < VGA_MEM_BASE) || > > > - (hvm_mmio_last_byte(p) >= (VGA_MEM_BASE + > VGA_MEM_SIZE)) ) > > > + if ( !s->stdvga ) > > > goto reject; > > > > > > if ( p->dir == IOREQ_WRITE && p->count > 1 ) > > > > The crash is gone, so in that respect: > > > > Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > But my guest seems stuck at boot for some reason, the last line of xl > > dmesg is: > > > > (XEN) stdvga.c:151:d3v0 leaving stdvga mode > > > > and this is the guest state: > > > > # ./xenctx -a 3 > > rip: fffff80001497de0 > > flags: 00000002 nz > > rsp: fffff80001479538 > > rax: 0000000000000000 rcx: 00000000000003fe rdx: 00000000000003fe > > rbx: fffff8000149a110 rsi: fffff80001479601 rdi: 0000000000009860 > > rbp: 0000000000000000 r8: fffff8000149a174 r9: 0000000000000000 > > r10: 00000000000027d7 r11: fffff800014795a0 r12: 0000000000000000 > > r13: 0000000000000004 r14: 0000000000000002 r15: 0000000000000000 > > cs: 0010 ss: 0018 ds: 002b es: 002b > > fs: 0053 @ 0000000000000000 > > gs: 002b @ fffff80001805d00/fffff80001805d00 > > > > cr0: 0000000080050031 > > cr2: 0000000000000030 > > cr3: 0000000000187000 > > cr4: 00000000000006b8 > > > > dr0: 0000000000000000 > > dr1: 0000000000000000 > > dr2: 0000000000000000 > > dr3: 0000000000000000 > > dr6: 00000000fffe0ff0 > > dr7: 0000000000000400 > > Code (instr addr fffff80001497de0) > > 90 8a c2 0f b7 d1 ee c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f b7 d1 ec <c3> 90 > > 90 90 90 90 90 90 88 11 f0 > > > > But it's too early to tell that this isn't something my V5 code is now > > doing, so I'll come back if it turns out to be unrelated. > > > > I'm setting up my test rig again now. I've not been able to repro so far. I'm using Windows 7 32-bit installation from ISO + cirrus VGA + ROMBIOS + shadow paging, which usually hits emulation pretty hard. Paul > > Paul > > > > > Thanks, > > Razvan > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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