[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
> -----Original Message----- > From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > Sent: 13 July 2015 10:03 > To: Paul Durrant; Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation > > On 07/13/2015 12:01 PM, Paul Durrant wrote: > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] > >> Sent: 13 July 2015 09:50 > >> To: Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > >> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich; Paul Durrant > >> Subject: Re: Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation > >> > >> On 07/13/2015 11:10 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >>> On 13/07/2015 08:48, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: > >>>> Hello, > >>>> > >>>> I'm battling the following hypervisor crash with current staging: > >>>> > >>>> (d2) Invoking ROMBIOS ... > >>>> (XEN) stdvga.c:147:d2v0 entering stdvga and caching modes > >>>> (d2) VGABios $Id: vgabios.c,v 1.67 2008/01/27 09:44:12 vruppert Exp $ > >>>> (XEN) Watchdog timer detects that CPU7 is stuck! > >>>> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- > >>>> (XEN) CPU: 7 > >>>> (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54 > >>>> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000202 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d2v0) > >>>> (XEN) rax: 000000000000c11d rbx: ffff83041e687970 rcx: > >> 000000000000c11e > >>>> (XEN) rdx: ffff83041e687970 rsi: 000000000000c11e rdi: > ffff83041e687978 > >>>> (XEN) rbp: ffff83040eb37208 rsp: ffff83040eb37200 r8: > >> 0000000000000000 > >>>> (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: ffff82d08028c3c0 r11: > >> 0000000000000000 > >>>> (XEN) r12: ffff83041e687000 r13: ffff83041e687970 r14: > ffff83040eb37278 > >>>> (XEN) r15: 00000000000c253f cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: > >> 00000000001526e0 > >>>> (XEN) cr3: 00000004054a0000 cr2: 0000000000000000 > >>>> (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008 > >>>> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83040eb37200: > >>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb37278 ffff83040eb37238 ffff82d0801d09b6 > >> 0000000000000282 > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000008 ffff830403791bf0 ffff83041e687000 > >> ffff83040eb37268 > >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801cb23a 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 > >> 0000000000000001 > >>>> (XEN) 00000000000000c2 ffff83040eb37298 ffff82d0801cb410 > >> 00000000000c253f > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0100000000000000 > >> ffff83040eb37328 > >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801c2403 ffff83040eb37394 ffff83040eb30000 > >> 0000000000000000 > >>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb37360 00000000000000c2 ffff8304054cb000 > >> 000000000000053f > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb373f4 > >> 00000000000000c2 > >>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > >> ffff82d08028c620 > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37338 ffff82d0801c3e5d > >> ffff83040eb37398 > >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801cb107 000000010eb37394 ffff830403791bf0 > >> ffff830403791bf0 > >>>> (XEN) ffff83041e687000 ffff83040eb37398 ffff830403791bf0 > >> 0000000000000001 > >>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000001 00000000000c253f > >> ffff83040eb373c8 > >>>> (XEN) ffff82d0801cb291 ffff83040eb37b30 ffff8300d85fc000 > >> 0000000000000001 > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37428 ffff82d0801bb440 > >> 00000000000a0001 > >>>> (XEN) 00000000000c253f 0000000100000001 0111000000000000 > >> ffff83040eb37478 > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > >> 0000000000000001 > >>>> (XEN) 0000000000000001 ffff83040eb374a8 ffff82d0801bc0b9 > >> 0000000000000001 > >>>> (XEN) 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 00000000000a0001 > >> 0100000000000000 > >>>> (XEN) ffff83040eb37728 ffff82e00819dc60 0000000000000000 > >> ffff83040eb374c8 > >>>> (XEN) Xen call trace: > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801d09b6>] stdvga_mem_accept+0x3b/0x125 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb23a>] hvm_find_io_handler+0x68/0x8a > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb410>] hvm_mmio_internal+0x37/0x67 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c2403>] __hvm_copy+0xe9/0x37d > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c3e5d>] hvm_copy_from_guest_phys+0x14/0x16 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb107>] hvm_process_io_intercept+0x10b/0x1d6 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb291>] hvm_io_intercept+0x35/0x5b > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bb440>] hvmemul_do_io+0x1ff/0x2c1 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bc0b9>] hvmemul_do_io_addr+0x117/0x163 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bc129>] hvmemul_do_mmio_addr+0x24/0x26 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bcbb5>] hvmemul_rep_movs+0x1ef/0x335 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d080198b49>] x86_emulate+0x56c9/0x13088 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bbd26>] _hvm_emulate_one+0x186/0x281 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801bc1e8>] hvm_emulate_one+0x10/0x12 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb63e>] handle_mmio+0x54/0xd2 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cb700>] > handle_mmio_with_translation+0x44/0x46 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801c27f6>] > hvm_hap_nested_page_fault+0x15f/0x589 > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801e9741>] vmx_vmexit_handler+0x150e/0x188d > >>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801ee7d1>] vmx_asm_vmexit_handler+0x41/0xc0 > >>>> (XEN) > >>>> (XEN) > >>>> (XEN) **************************************** > >>>> (XEN) Panic on CPU 7: > >>>> (XEN) FATAL TRAP: vector = 2 (nmi) > >>>> (XEN) [error_code=0000] > >>>> (XEN) **************************************** > >>>> > >>>> At first I thought it was caused by V5 of the vm_event-based > >>>> introspection series, but I've rolled it back enough to apply V4 on top > >>>> of it (which has been thoroughly tested on Thursday), and it still > >>>> happens, so this would at least appear to be unrelated at this point > >>>> (other than the fact that our use case is maybe somewhat unusual with > >>>> heavy emulation). > >>>> > >>>> I'll keep digging, but since this is a busy time for Xen I thought I'd > >>>> issue a heads-up here as soon as possible, in case the problem is > >>>> obvious for somebody and it helps getting it fixed sooner. > >>> > >>> In c/s 3bbaaec09b1b942f5624dee176da6e416d31f982 there is now a > >>> deliberate split between stdvga_mem_accept() and > >> stdvga_mem_complete() > >>> about locking and unlocking the stdvga lock. > >>> > >>> At a guess, the previous chain of execution accidentally omitted the > >>> stdvga_mem_complete() call. > >> > >> Thanks, I've reverted that patch and the crash is gone. I'll be happy to > >> test a fix if one is provided, but I don't know enough about that code > >> to go mess with it... > >> > > > > The problem appears to be that __hvm_copy() is calling this code before > establishing the type of the page: > > > > /* > > * No need to do the P2M lookup for internally handled MMIO, > benefiting > > * - 32-bit WinXP (& older Windows) on AMD CPUs for LAPIC accesses, > > * - newer Windows (like Server 2012) for HPET accesses. > > */ > > if ( !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(curr) > > && is_hvm_vcpu(curr) > > && hvm_mmio_internal(gpa) ) > > return HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn; > > > > ...and that call to hvm_mmio_internal is trying to re-acquire the lock. The > big question is why on earth was I not hitting this every time in testing > too... > This patch series has gone through some pretty rigorous tests. Anyway, I will > post a fix very shortly (since I know what needs to be done). > > > > Paul > > Thanks Paul! I appreciate the quick response. > While I'm prepping, try this: diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c index ebb3b42..08c797c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c @@ -490,11 +490,18 @@ static bool_t stdvga_mem_accept(const struct hvm_io_handle { struct hvm_hw_stdvga *s = ¤t->domain->arch.hvm_domain.stdvga; + /* + * The range check must be done without taking any locks, to avoid + * deadlock when hvm_mmio_internal() is called from + * hvm_copy_to/from_guest_phys() in hvm_process_io_intercept(). + */ + if ( (hvm_mmio_first_byte(p) < VGA_MEM_BASE) || + (hvm_mmio_last_byte(p) >= (VGA_MEM_BASE + VGA_MEM_SIZE)) ) + return 0; + spin_lock(&s->lock); - if ( !s->stdvga || - (hvm_mmio_first_byte(p) < VGA_MEM_BASE) || - (hvm_mmio_last_byte(p) >= (VGA_MEM_BASE + VGA_MEM_SIZE)) ) + if ( !s->stdvga ) goto reject; if ( p->dir == IOREQ_WRITE && p->count > 1 ) Paul > > Cheers, > Razvan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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