Re: [Xen-devel] Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation

[Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Razvan Cojocaru [mailto:rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: 13 July 2015 09:50
> To: Andrew Cooper; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: Keir (Xen.org); Jan Beulich; Paul Durrant
> Subject: Re: Deadlock in stdvga_mem_accept() with emulation
> 
> On 07/13/2015 11:10 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > On 13/07/2015 08:48, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> I'm battling the following hypervisor crash with current staging:
> >>
> >> (d2) Invoking ROMBIOS ...
> >> (XEN) stdvga.c:147:d2v0 entering stdvga and caching modes
> >> (d2) VGABios $Id: vgabios.c,v 1.67 2008/01/27 09:44:12 vruppert Exp $
> >> (XEN) Watchdog timer detects that CPU7 is stuck!
> >> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable  x86_64  debug=y  Not tainted ]----
> >> (XEN) CPU:    7
> >> (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54
> >> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000202   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d2v0)
> >> (XEN) rax: 000000000000c11d   rbx: ffff83041e687970   rcx:
> 000000000000c11e
> >> (XEN) rdx: ffff83041e687970   rsi: 000000000000c11e   rdi: ffff83041e687978
> >> (XEN) rbp: ffff83040eb37208   rsp: ffff83040eb37200   r8:
> 0000000000000000
> >> (XEN) r9:  0000000000000000   r10: ffff82d08028c3c0   r11:
> 0000000000000000
> >> (XEN) r12: ffff83041e687000   r13: ffff83041e687970   r14: ffff83040eb37278
> >> (XEN) r15: 00000000000c253f   cr0: 000000008005003b   cr4:
> 00000000001526e0
> >> (XEN) cr3: 00000004054a0000   cr2: 0000000000000000
> >> (XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: 0000   cs: e008
> >> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83040eb37200:
> >> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37278 ffff83040eb37238 ffff82d0801d09b6
> 0000000000000282
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000008 ffff830403791bf0 ffff83041e687000
> ffff83040eb37268
> >> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb23a 00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000
> 0000000000000001
> >> (XEN)    00000000000000c2 ffff83040eb37298 ffff82d0801cb410
> 00000000000c253f
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0100000000000000
> ffff83040eb37328
> >> (XEN)    ffff82d0801c2403 ffff83040eb37394 ffff83040eb30000
> 0000000000000000
> >> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37360 00000000000000c2 ffff8304054cb000
> 000000000000053f
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffff83040eb373f4
> 00000000000000c2
> >> (XEN)    ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
> ffff82d08028c620
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37338 ffff82d0801c3e5d
> ffff83040eb37398
> >> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb107 000000010eb37394 ffff830403791bf0
> ffff830403791bf0
> >> (XEN)    ffff83041e687000 ffff83040eb37398 ffff830403791bf0
> 0000000000000001
> >> (XEN)    ffff83040eb373d8 0000000000000001 00000000000c253f
> ffff83040eb373c8
> >> (XEN)    ffff82d0801cb291 ffff83040eb37b30 ffff8300d85fc000
> 0000000000000001
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff83040eb37428 ffff82d0801bb440
> 00000000000a0001
> >> (XEN)    00000000000c253f 0000000100000001 0111000000000000
> ffff83040eb37478
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000001
> >> (XEN)    0000000000000001 ffff83040eb374a8 ffff82d0801bc0b9
> 0000000000000001
> >> (XEN)    00000000000c253f ffff8300d85fc000 00000000000a0001
> 0100000000000000
> >> (XEN)    ffff83040eb37728 ffff82e00819dc60 0000000000000000
> ffff83040eb374c8
> >> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d08012c3f1>] _spin_lock+0x31/0x54
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801d09b6>] stdvga_mem_accept+0x3b/0x125
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb23a>] hvm_find_io_handler+0x68/0x8a
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb410>] hvm_mmio_internal+0x37/0x67
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c2403>] __hvm_copy+0xe9/0x37d
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c3e5d>] hvm_copy_from_guest_phys+0x14/0x16
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb107>] hvm_process_io_intercept+0x10b/0x1d6
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb291>] hvm_io_intercept+0x35/0x5b
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bb440>] hvmemul_do_io+0x1ff/0x2c1
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc0b9>] hvmemul_do_io_addr+0x117/0x163
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc129>] hvmemul_do_mmio_addr+0x24/0x26
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bcbb5>] hvmemul_rep_movs+0x1ef/0x335
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d080198b49>] x86_emulate+0x56c9/0x13088
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bbd26>] _hvm_emulate_one+0x186/0x281
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bc1e8>] hvm_emulate_one+0x10/0x12
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb63e>] handle_mmio+0x54/0xd2
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cb700>] handle_mmio_with_translation+0x44/0x46
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c27f6>] hvm_hap_nested_page_fault+0x15f/0x589
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801e9741>] vmx_vmexit_handler+0x150e/0x188d
> >> (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801ee7d1>] vmx_asm_vmexit_handler+0x41/0xc0
> >> (XEN)
> >> (XEN)
> >> (XEN) ****************************************
> >> (XEN) Panic on CPU 7:
> >> (XEN) FATAL TRAP: vector = 2 (nmi)
> >> (XEN) [error_code=0000]
> >> (XEN) ****************************************
> >>
> >> At first I thought it was caused by V5 of the vm_event-based
> >> introspection series, but I've rolled it back enough to apply V4 on top
> >> of it (which has been thoroughly tested on Thursday), and it still
> >> happens, so this would at least appear to be unrelated at this point
> >> (other than the fact that our use case is maybe somewhat unusual with
> >> heavy emulation).
> >>
> >> I'll keep digging, but since this is a busy time for Xen I thought I'd
> >> issue a heads-up here as soon as possible, in case the problem is
> >> obvious for somebody and it helps getting it fixed sooner.
> >
> > In c/s 3bbaaec09b1b942f5624dee176da6e416d31f982 there is now a
> > deliberate split between stdvga_mem_accept() and
> stdvga_mem_complete()
> > about locking and unlocking the stdvga lock.
> >
> > At a guess, the previous chain of execution accidentally omitted the
> > stdvga_mem_complete() call.
> 
> Thanks, I've reverted that patch and the crash is gone. I'll be happy to
> test a fix if one is provided, but I don't know enough about that code
> to go mess with it...
> 

The problem appears to be that __hvm_copy() is calling this code before 
establishing the type of the page:

        /*
         * No need to do the P2M lookup for internally handled MMIO, benefiting
         * - 32-bit WinXP (& older Windows) on AMD CPUs for LAPIC accesses,
         * - newer Windows (like Server 2012) for HPET accesses.
         */
        if ( !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(curr)
             && is_hvm_vcpu(curr)
             && hvm_mmio_internal(gpa) )
            return HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn;

...and that call to hvm_mmio_internal is trying to re-acquire the lock. The big 
question is why on earth was I not hitting this every time in testing too... 
This patch series has gone through some pretty rigorous tests. Anyway, I will 
post a fix very shortly (since I know what needs to be done).

  Paul

> 
> Thanks,
> Razvan
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