[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [RFC XEN PATCH v3 2/3] x86/pvh: Add (un)map_pirq and setup_gsi for PVH dom0
On 14.12.2023 10:55, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 08:55:45AM +0000, Chen, Jiqian wrote: >> On 2023/12/13 15:03, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 13.12.2023 03:47, Chen, Jiqian wrote: >>>> On 2023/12/12 17:30, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 12.12.2023 07:49, Chen, Jiqian wrote: >>>>>> On 2023/12/11 23:31, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 11, 2023 at 12:40:08AM +0800, Jiqian Chen wrote: >>>>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c >>>>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c >>>>>>>> @@ -72,8 +72,11 @@ long hvm_physdev_op(int cmd, >>>>>>>> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> switch ( cmd ) >>>>>>>> { >>>>>>>> + case PHYSDEVOP_setup_gsi: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think given the new approach on the Linux side patches, where >>>>>>> pciback will configure the interrupt, there's no need to expose >>>>>>> setup_gsi anymore? >>>>>> The latest patch(the second patch of v3 on kernel side) does setup_gsi >>>>>> and map_pirq for passthrough device in pciback, so we need this and >>>>>> below. >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> case PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq: >>>>>>>> case PHYSDEVOP_unmap_pirq: >>>>>>>> + if ( is_hardware_domain(currd) ) >>>>>>>> + break; >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Also Jan already pointed this out in v2: this hypercall needs to be >>>>>>> limited so a PVH dom0 cannot execute it against itself. IOW: refuse >>>>>>> the hypercall if DOMID_SELF or the passed domid matches the current >>>>>>> domain domid. >>>>>> Yes, I remember Jan's suggestion, but since the latest patch(the second >>>>>> patch of v3 on kernel side) has change the implementation, it does >>>>>> setup_gsi and map_pirq for dom0 itself, so I didn't add the DOMID_SELF >>>>>> check. >>>>> >>>>> And why exactly would it do specifically the map_pirq? (Even the setup_gsi >>>>> looks questionable to me, but there might be reasons there.) >>>> Map_pirq is to solve the check failure problem. (pci_add_dm_done-> >>>> xc_domain_irq_permission-> XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission-> >>>> pirq_access_permitted->domain_pirq_to_irq->return irq is 0) >>>> Setup_gsi is because the gsi is never be unmasked, so the gsi is never be >>>> registered( vioapic_hwdom_map_gsi-> mp_register_gsi is never be called). >>> >>> And it was previously made pretty clear by Roger, I think, that doing a >>> "map" >>> just for the purpose of granting permission is, well, at best a temporary >>> workaround in the early development phase. If there's presently no hypercall >>> to _only_ grant permission to IRQ, we need to add one. >> Could you please describe it in detail? Do you mean to add a new hypercall >> to grant irq access for dom0 or domU? >> It seems XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission is the hypercall to grant irq access from >> dom0 to domU(see XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission-> irq_permit_access). There is no >> need to add hypercall to grant irq access. >> We failed here (XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission-> >> pirq_access_permitted->domain_pirq_to_irq->return irq is 0) is because the >> PVH dom0 didn't use PIRQ, so we can't get irq from pirq if "current" is PVH >> dom0. > > One way to bodge this would be to detect whether the caller of > XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission is a PV or an HVM domain, and in case of HVM > assume the pirq field is a GSI. I'm unsure however how that will work > with non-x86 architectures. > > It would be better to introduce a new XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, or > maybe XEN_DOMCTL_intr_permission that can take a struct we can use to > accommodate GSIs and other arch specific interrupt identifiers. How would you see MSI being handled then? Jan
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