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Re: [RFC XEN PATCH v3 2/3] x86/pvh: Add (un)map_pirq and setup_gsi for PVH dom0



On Thu, Dec 14, 2023 at 08:55:45AM +0000, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
> On 2023/12/13 15:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > On 13.12.2023 03:47, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
> >> On 2023/12/12 17:30, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 12.12.2023 07:49, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
> >>>> On 2023/12/11 23:31, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 11, 2023 at 12:40:08AM +0800, Jiqian Chen wrote:
> >>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
> >>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
> >>>>>> @@ -72,8 +72,11 @@ long hvm_physdev_op(int cmd, 
> >>>>>> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
> >>>>>>  
> >>>>>>      switch ( cmd )
> >>>>>>      {
> >>>>>> +    case PHYSDEVOP_setup_gsi:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I think given the new approach on the Linux side patches, where
> >>>>> pciback will configure the interrupt, there's no need to expose
> >>>>> setup_gsi anymore?
> >>>> The latest patch(the second patch of v3 on kernel side) does setup_gsi 
> >>>> and map_pirq for passthrough device in pciback, so we need this and 
> >>>> below.
> >>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>      case PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq:
> >>>>>>      case PHYSDEVOP_unmap_pirq:
> >>>>>> +        if ( is_hardware_domain(currd) )
> >>>>>> +            break;
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Also Jan already pointed this out in v2: this hypercall needs to be
> >>>>> limited so a PVH dom0 cannot execute it against itself.  IOW: refuse
> >>>>> the hypercall if DOMID_SELF or the passed domid matches the current
> >>>>> domain domid.
> >>>> Yes, I remember Jan's suggestion, but since the latest patch(the second 
> >>>> patch of v3 on kernel side) has change the implementation, it does 
> >>>> setup_gsi and map_pirq for dom0 itself, so I didn't add the DOMID_SELF 
> >>>> check.
> >>>
> >>> And why exactly would it do specifically the map_pirq? (Even the setup_gsi
> >>> looks questionable to me, but there might be reasons there.)
> >> Map_pirq is to solve the check failure problem. (pci_add_dm_done-> 
> >> xc_domain_irq_permission-> XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission-> 
> >> pirq_access_permitted->domain_pirq_to_irq->return irq is 0)
> >> Setup_gsi is because the gsi is never be unmasked, so the gsi is never be 
> >> registered( vioapic_hwdom_map_gsi-> mp_register_gsi is never be called).
> > 
> > And it was previously made pretty clear by Roger, I think, that doing a 
> > "map"
> > just for the purpose of granting permission is, well, at best a temporary
> > workaround in the early development phase. If there's presently no hypercall
> > to _only_ grant permission to IRQ, we need to add one.
> Could you please describe it in detail? Do you mean to add a new hypercall to 
> grant irq access for dom0 or domU?
> It seems XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission is the hypercall to grant irq access from 
> dom0 to domU(see XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission-> irq_permit_access). There is no 
> need to add hypercall to grant irq access.
> We failed here (XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission-> 
> pirq_access_permitted->domain_pirq_to_irq->return irq is 0) is because the 
> PVH dom0 didn't use PIRQ, so we can't get irq from pirq if "current" is PVH 
> dom0.

One way to bodge this would be to detect whether the caller of
XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission is a PV or an HVM domain, and in case of HVM
assume the pirq field is a GSI.  I'm unsure however how that will work
with non-x86 architectures.

It would  be better to introduce a new XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, or
maybe XEN_DOMCTL_intr_permission that can take a struct we can use to
accommodate GSIs and other arch specific interrupt identifiers.

I'm also wondering whether the hypercall should be in a stable
interface so it could be easily used from QEMU if needed.

> So, it seems the logic of XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission is not suitable when PVH 
> dom0? Maybe it directly needs to get irq from the caller(domU) instead of 
> "current" if the "current" has no PIRQ flag?

Hm, I'm kind of confused by this last sentence, as you mention "the
caller(domU)".  The caller of XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will always be
dom0 or the hardware domain.

Thanks, Roger.



 


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