[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] Determining iommu groups in Xen?

On 28 August 2014 18:13:07 BST, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>On 28/08/14 17:48, Peter Kay wrote:
>> Fair enough; possibly not ideal but it's an administrator function
>with calculated risk. A warning might be nice, though.
>I am not aware of a single server platform which doesn't have a single
>erraturm which breaks the end-to-end security or functionality of PCI
>Passthrough.  I would love to be proved wrong in this regard.

I will try and find the PCI quirk posts for KVM.

>I am confused as to what exactly you mean by iommu groups in this
>context.  My initial guess of the iommu context identifiers for HAP/EPT
>tables was clearly wrong.
An iommu group, as far as I'm aware, is the group of devices that are not 
protected from each other. In KVM, you must pass through the entire group to a 
VM at once, unless a 'don't go crying to me if it stomps over your memory space 
or worse' patch is applied to the kennel claiming that everything is fine.

>Almost certainly to do with the (lack of correct) RMRR support.  There
>is a patch series on-list attempting to remedy this problem.
Thank you, I'll search for this. It does pass through reliably in KVM, which is 
good, because their virtual USB sucks. I'm reasonably certain that my S3210SHLC 
motherboard is quite solid, provided you accept some of the interesting design 
decisions. (Well, apart from leaving the X38 audio chipset inaccessible, but 
present enough to confuse the Linux kernel to hang on boot occasionally)

Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.