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RE: [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/iommu: make code addressing CVE-2011-1898 no VT-d specific
- To: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@xxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 05:07:34 +0000
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- Cc: "Beulich, Jan" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>, Pau Monné, Roger <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Wed, 01 Feb 2023 05:08:13 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
- Thread-index: AQHZL/FVJOdom3IWD0Wag5ryo7ERT665k35w
- Thread-topic: [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/iommu: make code addressing CVE-2011-1898 no VT-d specific
> From: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@xxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2023 8:42 PM
>
> The variable untrusted_msi indicates whether the system is vulnerable to
> CVE-2011-1898 due to the absence of interrupt remapping support.
> Although AMD iommus with interrupt remapping disabled are also affected,
> this case is not handled yet. Given that the issue is not VT-d specific,
> and to accommodate future use of the flag for covering also the AMD iommu
> case, move the definition of the flag out of the VT-d specific code to the
> common x86 iommu code.
>
> Also, since the current implementation assumes that only PV guests are
> prone
> to this attack, take the opportunity to define untrusted_msi only when PV is
> enabled.
>
I'm fine with this change given no functional change.
But I'm curious about the statement here that the current code only
applies to PV guest. I didn't see such statement in original mail [1]
and in concept a HVM guest with passthrough device can also do such
attack w/o interrupt remapping.
Any more context?
[1]
http://old-list-archives.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2011-05/msg00687.html
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