[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/6] xsm: flask: change the dummy xsm policy and flask hook for map_gmfn_foregin
The original dummy xsm_map_gmfn_foregin checks if source domain has the proper privileges over the target domain. Under this policy, it's not allowed if a Dom0 wants to map pages from one DomU to another, which restricts some useful yet not dangerous use cases of the API, such as sharing pages among DomU's by calling XENMEM_add_to_physmap from Dom0. For the dummy xsm_map_gmfn_foregin, change to policy to: IFF the current domain has the proper privileges on (d) and (t), grant the access. For the flask side: 1) Introduce a new av permission MMU__SHARE_MEM to denote if two domains can share memory through map_gmfn_foregin. 2) Change to hook to grant the access IFF the current domain has proper MMU privileges on (d) and (t), and MMU__SHARE_MEM is allowed between (d) and (t). 3) Modify the default xen.te to allow MMU__SHARE_MEM for normal domains that allow grant mapping/event channels. References to the xsm check have also been updated to pass the current domain as a new parameter. This is for the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config file" (see [1]). [1] https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-08/msg03242.html Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx --- v2: * Preserve the error code in both the dummy xsm callback and the flask hook. * Also check if (d) and (t) can share memory in the flask hook. --- tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 2 ++ xen/arch/arm/mm.c | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 2 +- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 8 ++++++-- xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 7 ++++--- xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 10 ++++++++-- xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if index ed0df4f010..edb7dc8b50 100644 --- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if @@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ define(`domain_comms', ` domain_event_comms($1, $2) allow $1 $2:grant { map_read map_write copy unmap }; allow $2 $1:grant { map_read map_write copy unmap }; + allow $1 $2:mmu share_mem; + allow $2 $1:mmu share_mem; ') # domain_self_comms(domain) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c index a810a056d7..9ec78d8c03 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c @@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one( return -EINVAL; } - rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, d, od); + rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d, od); if ( rc ) { rcu_unlock_domain(od); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c index e8a57d118c..a547fd00c0 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c @@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long fgfn, if ( tdom == fdom ) goto out; - rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, tdom, fdom); + rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, tdom, fdom); if ( rc ) goto out; diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h index 62fcea6f04..1a42d85d27 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h @@ -525,10 +525,14 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_remove_from_physmap(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d1, return xsm_default_action(action, d1, d2); } -static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *t) +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *cd, + struct domain *d, struct domain *t) { + int rc; XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET); - return xsm_default_action(action, d, t); + rc = xsm_default_action(action, cd, d); + if (rc) return rc; + return xsm_default_action(action, cd, t); } static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, unsigned long op) diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index 60c0fd6a62..a20654a803 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct xsm_operations { int (*memory_pin_page) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2, struct page_info *page); int (*add_to_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2); int (*remove_from_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2); - int (*map_gmfn_foreign) (struct domain *d, struct domain *t); + int (*map_gmfn_foreign) (struct domain *cd, struct domain *d, struct domain *t); int (*claim_pages) (struct domain *d); int (*console_io) (struct domain *d, int cmd); @@ -372,9 +372,10 @@ static inline int xsm_remove_from_physmap(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d1, return xsm_ops->remove_from_physmap(d1, d2); } -static inline int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, struct domain *t) +static inline int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *cd, + struct domain *d, struct domain *t) { - return xsm_ops->map_gmfn_foreign(d, t); + return xsm_ops->map_gmfn_foreign(cd, d, t); } static inline int xsm_claim_pages(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 91146275bb..c80e21e7ee 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -1165,9 +1165,15 @@ static int flask_remove_from_physmap(struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2) return domain_has_perm(d1, d2, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__PHYSMAP); } -static int flask_map_gmfn_foreign(struct domain *d, struct domain *t) +static int flask_map_gmfn_foreign(struct domain *cd, + struct domain *d, struct domain *t) { - return domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | MMU__MAP_WRITE); + int rc; + rc = domain_has_perm(cd, d, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | MMU__MAP_WRITE); + if (rc) return rc; + rc = domain_has_perm(cd, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | MMU__MAP_WRITE); + if (rc) return rc; + return domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__SHARE_MEM); } static int flask_hvm_param(struct domain *d, unsigned long op) diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors index 1f7eb35fc8..0ba7505387 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors @@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ class mmu # Allow a privileged domain to install a map of a page it does not own. Used # for stub domain device models with the PV framebuffer. target_hack +# Checked when using map_gmfn_foreign to share memory: +# source = domain whose memory is being shared +# target = client domain + share_mem } # control of the paging_domctl split by subop -- 2.14.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |