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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3] x86/altp2m: Add a hvmop for setting the suppress #VE bit



On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 11:27:44AM -0600, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:07 AM, Adrian Pop <apop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Introduce a new hvmop, HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve, which allows a
> > domain to change the value of the #VE suppress bit for a page.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Adrian Pop <apop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c          | 14 ++++++++++++
> >  xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c    | 48 
> > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 15 +++++++++++++
> >  xen/include/xen/mem_access.h    |  3 +++
> >  4 files changed, 80 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> > index 2e76c2345b..eb01527c5b 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> > @@ -4356,6 +4356,7 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
> >      case HVMOP_altp2m_destroy_p2m:
> >      case HVMOP_altp2m_switch_p2m:
> >      case HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access:
> > +    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve:
> >      case HVMOP_altp2m_change_gfn:
> >          break;
> >      default:
> > @@ -4472,6 +4473,19 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
> >                                      a.u.set_mem_access.view);
> >          break;
> >
> > +    case HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve:
> > +        if ( a.u.set_suppress_ve.pad1 || a.u.set_suppress_ve.pad2 )
> > +            rc = -EINVAL;
> > +        else
> > +        {
> > +            gfn_t gfn = _gfn(a.u.set_mem_access.gfn);
> > +            unsigned int altp2m_idx = a.u.set_mem_access.view;
> > +            uint8_t suppress_ve = a.u.set_suppress_ve.suppress_ve;
> > +
> > +            rc = p2m_set_suppress_ve(d, gfn, suppress_ve, altp2m_idx);
> > +        }
> > +        break;
> > +
> >      case HVMOP_altp2m_change_gfn:
> >          if ( a.u.change_gfn.pad1 || a.u.change_gfn.pad2 )
> >              rc = -EINVAL;
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> > index d0b0767855..b9e611d3db 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> > @@ -466,6 +466,54 @@ int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, 
> > xenmem_access_t *access)
> >  }
> >
> >  /*
> > + * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for a page.  Only available on VMX.
> > + */
> > +int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint8_t suppress_ve,
> > +                        unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> > +{
> > +    struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
> > +    struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
> > +    struct p2m_domain *p2m = NULL;
> > +    mfn_t mfn;
> > +    p2m_access_t a;
> > +    p2m_type_t t;
> > +    unsigned long gfn_l;
> > +    int rc = 0;
> > +
> > +    if ( !cpu_has_vmx )
> > +        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > +    if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
> > +    {
> > +        if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
> > +                d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
> > +            return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +        p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
> > +    }
> > +    else
> > +    {
> > +        p2m = host_p2m;
> > +    }
> 
> 
> IMHO there should be some further checks here to verify that the
> domain has issued HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_enable_notify before and that it
> was allowed (ie. this hypercall should not be able to enable the
> suppress_bit if there is no veinfo_gfn). That said, is there anything

Ok, a check can be added easily.  The reasoning behind not adding it in
the first place was that should the #VE be disabled in the VM's VMCS,
setting/clearing the suppress #VE bit would do nothing (it is ignored).

> that would prevent a malicious application issuing rouge altp2m HVMOPs
> from messing with this if it is activated (which I guess stands for
> the rest of the altp2m ops too)?

AFAIK there isn't any safeguard of this sort.  I might just be
excessively ignorant, though.  On the other hand the current default
behavior is to enable #VE for all the pages.  The default with these
patches would be to issue a VM-Exit, and either a SVA, the Dom0 or the
target DomU itself could modify this behavior to generate #VE instead of
VM-Exit.  In any case I'll investigate some more.

Thanks!

> > +
> > +    p2m_lock(host_p2m);
> > +    if ( ap2m )
> > +        p2m_lock(ap2m);
> > +
> > +    gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn);
> > +    mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &a, 0, NULL, NULL);
> > +    if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) )
> > +        return -ESRCH;
> > +    rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a,
> > +                        suppress_ve);
> > +    if ( ap2m )
> > +        p2m_unlock(ap2m);
> > +    p2m_unlock(host_p2m);
> > +
> > +    return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> >   * Local variables:
> >   * mode: C
> >   * c-file-style: "BSD"
> > diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h 
> > b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> > index bc00ef0e65..9736092f58 100644
> > --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> > @@ -231,6 +231,18 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access {
> >  typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access 
> > xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access_t;
> >  DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access_t);
> >
> > +struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_suppress_ve {
> > +    /* view */
> > +    uint16_t view;
> > +    uint8_t suppress_ve;
> > +    uint8_t pad1;
> > +    uint32_t pad2;
> > +    /* gfn */
> > +    uint64_t gfn;
> > +};
> > +typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_suppress_ve 
> > xen_hvm_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_t;
> > +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_set_suppress_ve_t);
> > +
> >  struct xen_hvm_altp2m_change_gfn {
> >      /* view */
> >      uint16_t view;
> > @@ -262,6 +274,8 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
> >  #define HVMOP_altp2m_set_mem_access       7
> >  /* Change a p2m entry to have a different gfn->mfn mapping */
> >  #define HVMOP_altp2m_change_gfn           8
> > +/* Set the "Suppress #VE" bit on a page */
> > +#define HVMOP_altp2m_set_suppress_ve      9
> >      domid_t domain;
> >      uint16_t pad1;
> >      uint32_t pad2;
> > @@ -270,6 +284,7 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
> >          struct xen_hvm_altp2m_vcpu_enable_notify enable_notify;
> >          struct xen_hvm_altp2m_view               view;
> >          struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_mem_access     set_mem_access;
> > +        struct xen_hvm_altp2m_set_suppress_ve    set_suppress_ve;
> >          struct xen_hvm_altp2m_change_gfn         change_gfn;
> >          uint8_t pad[64];
> >      } u;
> > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
> > index 5ab34c1553..b6e6a7650a 100644
> > --- a/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
> > @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access_multi(struct domain *d,
> >   */
> >  int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, xenmem_access_t 
> > *access);
> >
> > +int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint8_t suppress_ve,
> > +                        unsigned int altp2m_idx);
> > +
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_MEM_ACCESS
> >  int mem_access_memop(unsigned long cmd,
> >                       XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mem_access_op_t) arg);
> > --
> > 2.12.1
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Xen-devel mailing list
> > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

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