[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3] x86/altp2m: Add a hvmop for setting the suppress #VE bit
>>> On 18.05.17 at 17:07, <apop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c > @@ -466,6 +466,54 @@ int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, > xenmem_access_t *access) > } > > /* > + * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for a page. Only available on VMX. > + */ > +int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint8_t suppress_ve, suppress_ve presumably is meant to be boolean. > + unsigned int altp2m_idx) > +{ > + struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d); > + struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL; > + struct p2m_domain *p2m = NULL; Pointless initializer. > + mfn_t mfn; > + p2m_access_t a; > + p2m_type_t t; > + unsigned long gfn_l; Please avoid this local variable and use gfn_x() in the two places you need to. > + int rc = 0; Pointless initializer again. > + > + if ( !cpu_has_vmx ) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; Is this enough? Wouldn't it be better to signal the caller whenever hardware (or even software) isn't going to honor the request? > + if ( altp2m_idx > 0 ) > + { > + if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M || > + d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) ) Indentation. > + return -EINVAL; > + > + p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx]; > + } > + else > + { > + p2m = host_p2m; > + } Unnecessary braces. > + p2m_lock(host_p2m); > + if ( ap2m ) > + p2m_lock(ap2m); > + > + gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn); > + mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &a, 0, NULL, NULL); > + if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) > + return -ESRCH; > + rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a, > + suppress_ve); > + if ( ap2m ) > + p2m_unlock(ap2m); > + p2m_unlock(host_p2m); To fiddle with a single gfn, this looks to be very heavy locking. While for now gfn_lock() is the same as p2m_lock(), from an abstract perspective I'd expect gfn_lock() to suffice here at least in the non-altp2m case. And then there are two general questions: Without a libxc layer function, how is one supposed to use this new sub-op? Is it really intended to permit a guest to call this for itself? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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