[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH V6 4/5] xen/mm: Clean up pfec handling in gva_to_gfn
At the moment, the pfec argument to gva_to_gfn has two functions: * To inform guest_walk what kind of access is happenind * As a value to pass back into the guest in the event of a fault. Unfortunately this is not quite treated consistently: the hvm_fetch_* function will "pre-clear" the PFEC_insn_fetch flag before calling gva_to_gfn; meaning guest_walk doesn't actually know whether a given access is an instruction fetch or not. This works now, but will cause issues when pkeys are introduced, since guest_walk will need to know whether an access is an instruction fetch even if it doesn't return PFEC_insn_fetch. Fix this by making a clean separation for in and out functionalities of the pfec argument: 1. Always pass in the access type to gva_to_gfn 2. Filter out inappropriate access flags before returning from gva_to_gfn. (The PFEC_insn_fetch flag should only be passed to the guest if either NX or SMEP is enabled. See Intel 64 Developer's Manual, Volume 3, Section 4.7.) Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@xxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 8 ++------ xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c | 10 +++++++++- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 21470ec..688d200 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -4432,11 +4432,9 @@ enum hvm_copy_result hvm_copy_from_guest_virt( enum hvm_copy_result hvm_fetch_from_guest_virt( void *buf, unsigned long vaddr, int size, uint32_t pfec) { - if ( hvm_nx_enabled(current) || hvm_smep_enabled(current) ) - pfec |= PFEC_insn_fetch; return __hvm_copy(buf, vaddr, size, HVMCOPY_from_guest | HVMCOPY_fault | HVMCOPY_virt, - PFEC_page_present | pfec); + PFEC_page_present | PFEC_insn_fetch | pfec); } enum hvm_copy_result hvm_copy_to_guest_virt_nofault( @@ -4458,11 +4456,9 @@ enum hvm_copy_result hvm_copy_from_guest_virt_nofault( enum hvm_copy_result hvm_fetch_from_guest_virt_nofault( void *buf, unsigned long vaddr, int size, uint32_t pfec) { - if ( hvm_nx_enabled(current) || hvm_smep_enabled(current) ) - pfec |= PFEC_insn_fetch; return __hvm_copy(buf, vaddr, size, HVMCOPY_from_guest | HVMCOPY_no_fault | HVMCOPY_virt, - PFEC_page_present | pfec); + PFEC_page_present | PFEC_insn_fetch | pfec); } unsigned long copy_to_user_hvm(void *to, const void *from, unsigned int len) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c index 49d0328..3eb8597 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)( if ( !top_page ) { pfec[0] &= ~PFEC_page_present; - return INVALID_GFN; + goto out_tweak_pfec; } top_mfn = _mfn(page_to_mfn(top_page)); @@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)( if ( missing & _PAGE_SHARED ) pfec[0] = PFEC_page_shared; +out_tweak_pfec: + /* + * Intel 64 Volume 3, Section 4.7: The PFEC_insn_fetch flag is set + * only when NX or SMEP are enabled. + */ + if ( !hvm_nx_enabled(v) && !hvm_smep_enabled(v) ) + pfec[0] &= ~PFEC_insn_fetch; + return INVALID_GFN; } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c index 58f7e72..bbbc706 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c @@ -3668,6 +3668,12 @@ sh_gva_to_gfn(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, pfec[0] &= ~PFEC_page_present; if ( missing & _PAGE_INVALID_BITS ) pfec[0] |= PFEC_reserved_bit; + /* + * Intel 64 Volume 3, Section 4.7: The PFEC_insn_fetch flag is + * set only when NX or SMEP are enabled. + */ + if ( !hvm_nx_enabled(v) && !hvm_smep_enabled(v) ) + pfec[0] &= ~PFEC_insn_fetch; return INVALID_GFN; } gfn = guest_walk_to_gfn(&gw); -- 2.4.3 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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