[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
> -----Original Message----- > From: Gregory Gee [mailto:gregory.gee@xxxxxxxxxxxx] > Sent: 05 October 2006 01:45 > To: Petersson, Mats > Cc: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets > > Petersson, Mats wrote: > > > > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > >> [mailto:xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of > >> Gregory Gee > >> Sent: 04 October 2006 14:20 > >> To: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > >> Subject: Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets > >> > >> Thorolf Godawa wrote: > >> > >>> Hi, > >>> > >>> > >>>> I'm not sure if it's part of the translation or some > other sort of > >>>> misunderstanding, but chipsets (non-processor components) are not > >>>> necessary for the AMD-V technology (formerly Pacifica) to operate > >>>> > >>> I think he means s.th. related to the problem of the > >>> > >> virtualisation of > >> > >>> the i/o that the AMD-CPUs should do better than the first > >>> Intel-implementation of VT. > >>> > >>> AMD calls this "AMD I/O Virtualization Technology (IOMMU) > >>> Specification", you find a PDF here: > >>> > >>> > >> http://www.amd.com/us-en/assets/content_type/white_papers_and_ > >> tech_docs/34434.pdf > >> > >>> The "Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O > >>> > >> (VTd)" should be > >> > >>> implemented in a later version of Intel-VT (see PDF: > >>> > >>> > >> ftp://download.intel.com/technology/computing/vptech/Intel(r)_ > >> VT_for_Direct_IO.pdf > >> > >>> ). > >>> > >>> But actually I don't know the status of this technique too and if > >>> there are really advantages for the user right now! > >>> > >> Wouldn't this allow PCI pass-through for SVM which isn't > possible > >> today? I find PCI pas-through really useful but I can't > use it for > >> Windows guest in SVM. > >> > > > > Yes, that and better security are the two key points of this type of > > technology. > > > > The problem with PCI pass-through is that the fully-virtualized OS > > doesn't know the machine physical address, so when it tries > to tell the > > PCI device that it's got some data to work on, it gives the guest > > physical address - which is most likely NOT the machine physical > > address. IOMMU allows the mapping of DMA-memory from guest-physical > > address to machine-physical address. > > > > Since we can allow and disallow individual pages to be target to > > PCI-devices (or any other IO-devices), it allows for better > security in > > the system, since a device that has a bug or security hole > will still be > > prevented from reading/writing addresses that aren't specifically > > indicated as "allowed". Just like the MMU inside the CPU allows the > > application to access some pieces of memory, whilst others are not > > allowed to be accessed. > > > > -- > > Mats > > > > Great, two questions. > > 1. Would this allow a PCI device that is not supported in > Linux to be > used in a Windows SVM dom? Yes, there's no reason why support in Linux should have anything to do with things here - the device driver in Windows would be the only driver ever accessing the hardware - you'd have to "hide" it from Dom0 to use it in DomU anyways, so Dom0 would never see that device. > > 2. When and would it be available for consumer boards or only Operton > and high end MB? Don't know - I would think all types of platforms would get this feature - but that's just guessing... -- Mats > > Thanks, > Greg > > > > _______________________________________________ Xen-users mailing list Xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-users
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