[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
Petersson, Mats wrote: -----Original Message-----From: xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Gregory GeeSent: 04 October 2006 14:20 To: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets Thorolf Godawa wrote:virtualisation ofHi,I think he means s.th. related to the problem of theI'm not sure if it's part of the translation or some other sort of misunderstanding, but chipsets (non-processor components) are not necessary for the AMD-V technology (formerly Pacifica) to operatethe i/o that the AMD-CPUs should do better than the first Intel-implementation of VT.AMD calls this "AMD I/O Virtualization Technology (IOMMU) Specification", you find a PDF here:http://www.amd.com/us-en/assets/content_type/white_papers_and_tech_docs/34434.pdfThe "Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O(VTd)" should beimplemented in a later version of Intel-VT (see PDF:ftp://download.intel.com/technology/computing/vptech/Intel(r)_VT_for_Direct_IO.pdfWouldn't this allow PCI pass-through for SVM which isn't possible today? I find PCI pas-through really useful but I can't use it for Windows guest in SVM.).But actually I don't know the status of this technique too and if there are really advantages for the user right now!Yes, that and better security are the two key points of this type oftechnology.The problem with PCI pass-through is that the fully-virtualized OS doesn't know the machine physical address, so when it tries to tell the PCI device that it's got some data to work on, it gives the guest physical address - which is most likely NOT the machine physical address. IOMMU allows the mapping of DMA-memory from guest-physicaladdress to machine-physical address.Since we can allow and disallow individual pages to be target to PCI-devices (or any other IO-devices), it allows for better security in the system, since a device that has a bug or security hole will still be prevented from reading/writing addresses that aren't specifically indicated as "allowed". Just like the MMU inside the CPU allows the application to access some pieces of memory, whilst others are notallowed to be accessed.-- Mats Great, two questions.1. Would this allow a PCI device that is not supported in Linux to be used in a Windows SVM dom? 2. When and would it be available for consumer boards or only Operton and high end MB? Thanks, Greg _______________________________________________ Xen-users mailing list Xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-users
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