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Re: [PATCH RFC v2 17/42] securityfs: use fc_init_pseudo()



On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 12:05:55PM -0800, Chris Down wrote:
> Not a big deal, but userspace can see that node too, as
> /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.null. Opening it by path works in current
> kernels and fails with EACCES after this patch. Now, I don't know of
> anything that does that, but selinuxfs gets SB_I_NODEV cleared again in
> the next patch for the same kind of node, so I think we should do the
> same thing here. If not, it would be good to have a line in the
> changelog saying that opening it by path is meant to stop working.

Yeah, seems fine. Though, afaict aa refuses every read and write on
.null in aa_file_perm(). So this change only moves the EACCES from
read()/write() to open(). But I guess open() failing might be an issue,
idk.

I really really dislike this device node abuse on for both lsms. It's
sketchy as hell.



 


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