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Re: [PATCH] xen/x86/svm: Apply the virtual-8086 IOPL check to INT n only


  • To: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 13:54:34 +0100
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  • Cc: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx, teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:54:39 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 22.10.2026 22:29, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 22 Oct 2026, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 22/10/2026 2:55 pm, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
>>> On 10/20/26 11:41 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>>> In virtual-8086 mode with IOPL < 3, INT n raises #GP(0).  INT1, INT3
>>>> and INTO are not affected. They are delivered normally.
>>>>
>>>> svm_emul_swint_injection() applies the check to all of them, so an ICEBP
>>>> raises #GP instead of #DB.  It also reports the IDT entry in the #GP
>>>> error code instead of 0.
>>>>
>>>> Limit the check to INT n and use error code 0.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 5 ++++-
>>>>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>>> index 71e48351f2..df74531d1a 100644
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>>> @@ -1153,9 +1153,12 @@ static void svm_emul_swint_injection(struct
>>>> x86_event *event)
>>>>        * 32bit OS.  Someone with many TUITs can see about reading the
>>>> TSS
>>>>        * Software Interrupt Redirection bitmap.
>>>>        */
>>>> -    if ( (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) &&
>>>> +    if ( type == X86_ET_SW_INT && (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) &&
>>>>            MASK_EXTR(regs->eflags, X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) != 3 )
>>>> +    {
>>>> +        ec = 0;
>>>>           goto raise_exception;
>>>> +    }
>>>>         /*
>>>>        * Read all 8/16 bytes so the idtr limit check is applied
>>>> properly to
>>>
>>> I think this is correct. The check could perhaps move earlier to avoid
>>> needing
>>> to reset ec to 0.
>>>
>>> I do wonder though if there are other cases in the function where ec
>>> needs to
>>> be reset to 0? The pseudocode in the APM seems to have at least one
>>> other case.
>>
>> I confirmed, and indeed it is #GP[0] not #GP[sel].  Also that
>> ICEBP/INT3/INTO are not subject IOPL like this.
>>
>> I agree with Ross that this wants moving earlier; between the CR0.PE
>> check and deciding idte_size.  The comment also wants adjusting, so I
>> think it wants to look like this:
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>> index 71e48351f22c..c83b28d29727 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>> @@ -1140,6 +1140,17 @@ static void svm_emul_swint_injection(struct
>> x86_event *event)
>>      if ( !(vmcb_get_cr0(vmcb) & X86_CR0_PE) )
>>          goto raise_exception; /* TODO: support real-mode injection? */
>>  
>> +    /*
>> +     * In vm86 mode, INT $N is subject to IOPL.
>> +     *
>> +     * TODO: It is also subject to CR4.VME=1, which would require
>> reading the
>> +     * TSS Software Interrupt Redirection bitmap.
>> +     */
>> +    if ( type == X86_ET_SW_INT &&
>> +         regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM &&
>> +         MASK_EXTR(regs->eflags, X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) != 3 )
>> +        goto raise_exception;
>> +
>>      idte_size   = lm ? 16 : 8;
>>      idte_offset = trap * idte_size;
>>  
>> @@ -1147,16 +1158,6 @@ static void svm_emul_swint_injection(struct
>> x86_event *event)
>>      ec = (trap << 3) | X86_XEC_IDT |
>>           (type == X86_ET_PRIV_SW_EXC ? X86_XEC_EXT : 0);
>>  
>> -    /*
>> -     * TODO: This does not cover the v8086 mode with CR4.VME case
>> -     * correctly, but falls on the safe side from the point of view of a
>> -     * 32bit OS.  Someone with many TUITs can see about reading the TSS
>> -     * Software Interrupt Redirection bitmap.
>> -     */
>> -    if ( (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) &&
>> -         MASK_EXTR(regs->eflags, X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) != 3 )
>> -        goto raise_exception;
>> -
>>      /*
>>       * Read all 8/16 bytes so the idtr limit check is applied properly to
>>       * this entry, even though we don't look at all the words read.
>>
>>
>> I'm happy to adjust this on commit if you're happy?
> 
> Yes please, thank you!

Can we also have
Fixes: 897d59a426f1 ("x86/svm: Introduce svm_emul_swint_injection()")
then, please?

Jan



 


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