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Re: [PATCH 5/5] xen/riscv: add SFENCE.VMA after enabling paging





On 8/27/26 6:53 PM, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:


On 8/27/26 5:33 PM, Baptiste Le Duc wrote:
turn_on_mmu() writes satp to switch on Sv39 paging but never fences
afterwards.

Xen never allocates a non-zero ASID, so per the Privileged spec, sec.
12.2.1 "Supervisor Memory-Management Fence Instruction":

   "If the implementation does not provide ASIDs, or software chooses
   to always use ASID 0, then after every satp write, software should
   execute SFENCE.VMA with rs1=x0."

The spec text around this rule hedges with "may be necessary", but
RISC-V spec co-author Andrew Waterman confirmed on the ISA manual
issue tracker that the fence after a satp write is not optional in
this case: "The SFENCE after the SATP write is definitely necessary
... In general, you need to SFENCE after you've recycled an ASID.
Since we don't use ASIDs in the Linux kernel yet, every context
switch is effectively an ASID reuse, hence the full TLB flush." [1]
The same reasoning applies to Xen: with ASID always 0, this satp
write is indistinguishable from an ASID reuse to the hart, so the
fence is required for correctness.

But at the moment of execution of turn_on_mmu() we don't use any ASID, do we? It was used in check_pgtbl_mode_support() but at the end it is done:

     csr_write(CSR_SATP, 0);

     sfence_vma();

So basically Bare mode + flush all TLBs presented before and then up to

...


Add the missing SFENCE.VMA to order those page-table stores before
the hart's first translation under the new mapping.

[1] https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual/issues/226

Fixes: f5035d480f7a ("xen: add files needed for minimal riscv build")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  xen/arch/riscv/riscv64/head.S | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/riscv64/head.S b/xen/arch/riscv/riscv64/ head.S
index 9c40512e61..7f6edc972f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/riscv/riscv64/head.S
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/riscv64/head.S
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ FUNC(turn_on_mmu)
          srli    t1, t1, PAGE_SHIFT
          or      t1, t1, t0
          csrw    CSR_SATP, t1

... ASID isn't used as we are in Bare mode.

What am I missing?

After the conversation with Jan B. in the separate thread I re-read documentaion and found that ASID=0 will be used here too as after check_pgtbl_mode_support() we set Bare mode and ASID 0 will be really used even in Bare mode as to select MODE=Bare as software must write zero to the remaining fields of satp (bits 30–0 when SXLEN=32, or bits 59–0 when SXLEN=64) what automatically includes field ASID (so it will be zero).

But still the full reason why we need sfence.vma here is that TLB could be polluted with identity mapping (even in Bare mode) and which will be tagged by ASID=0.

So what about to update commit message with:
```
xen/riscv: flush speculatively cached Bare-mode TLB entries in turn_on_mmu()

The existing SFENCE.VMA before the satp write only orders the page table
stores from setup_initial_pagetables() against subsequent implicit reads.
It does not prevent the CPU from speculatively caching translations after the fence retires.

According to the RISC-V Privileged specification, implementations are
permitted to speculatively cache Bare-mode identity mappings. Furthermore,
selecting MODE=Bare (which happens during check_pgtbl_mode_support())
requires zeroing the remaining fields of satp, causing ASID=0 to be
actively used in Bare mode. Consequently, the TLB can be polluted with Bare
identity mappings tagged with ASID=0.

Once satp is written to enable Sv39 translation, these cached identity
mappings (tagged with ASID=0) can shadow the true Sv39 translations.
This would lead to translation failures since turn_on_mmu() jumps to
a non-identity-mapped linker address.

Fix this by adding a post-satp-write SFENCE.VMA to invalidate any stale
translations (including Bare-mode identity mappings under ASID=0) before
jumping to the virtual address space.
```

~ Oleksii



 


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