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[PATCH for-4.22? 2/9] domctl: move XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission handling to x86 code


  • To: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 16:12:39 +0200
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:12:43 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

HAS_PIRQ is selected by x86 only, and that's expected to remain that way.
Avoid the #ifdef needed by moving the logic to arch_do_domctl(). Leverage
"currd" being available as a local variable there while doing so.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -258,6 +258,36 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         break;
     }
 
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+    {
+        unsigned int pirq = domctl->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
+        bool allow = domctl->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
+
+        ret = -EINVAL;
+        if ( pirq >= currd->nr_pirqs )
+            break;
+
+        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(currd, pirq);
+
+        ret = -EPERM;
+        if ( irq )
+            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
+        if ( ret )
+            break;
+
+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+
+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+            ret = -EPERM;
+        else if ( allow )
+            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+        else
+            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+
+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+        break;
+    }
+
     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
     {
         int irq;
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -471,38 +471,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
     }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
-    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-    {
-        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
-        bool allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
-
-        ret = -EINVAL;
-        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
-            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-
-        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, pirq);
-
-        ret = -EPERM;
-        if ( irq )
-            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
-        if ( ret )
-            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-
-        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-
-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
-            ret = -EPERM;
-        else if ( allow )
-            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
-        else
-            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
-
-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-    }
-#endif
-
     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
     {
         struct domain *e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
@@ -563,6 +531,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
 
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:




 


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