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Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] xen/xsm: wrap xsm_vm_event_control() with CONFIG_VM_EVENT

To: Penny Zheng <Penny.Zheng@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 09:57:55 -0500

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Cc: ray.huang@xxxxxxx, grygorii_strashko@xxxxxxxx

Delivery-date: Tue, 25 Nov 2025 14:58:13 +0000

List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 11/21/25 4:15 AM, Penny Zheng wrote:

Function xsm_vm_event_control() is only invoked under CONFIG_VM_EVENT, so
it shall be wrapped with it, otherwiae it will become unreachable when

otherwiae --> otherwise (maybe committer is willing to fix on commit?)

VM_EVENT=n and hence violating Misra rule 2.1.

Signed-off-by: Penny Zheng <Penny.Zheng@xxxxxxx>
---
v1 -> v3:
- new commit
---
  xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 2 +-
  xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   | 4 ++--
  xen/xsm/dummy.c         | 2 +-
  xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   | 4 ++--
  4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index 12792c3a43..e801dbcdba 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -640,6 +640,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(
      }
  }

+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

  static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_vm_event_control(
      XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
  {
@@ -647,7 +648,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_vm_event_control(
      return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
  }

-#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

  static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_mem_access(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain 
*d)
  {
      XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 9a23d2827c..d9e5c831f3 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -155,9 +155,9 @@ struct xsm_ops {
      int (*hvm_altp2mhvm_op)(struct domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint32_t op);
      int (*get_vnumainfo)(struct domain *d);

+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

      int (*vm_event_control)(struct domain *d, int mode, int op);

-#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

      int (*mem_access)(struct domain *d);
  #endif

@@ -649,13 +649,13 @@ static inline int xsm_get_vnumainfo(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)

      return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_vnumainfo, d);
  }

+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

  static inline int xsm_vm_event_control(
      xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
  {
      return alternative_call(xsm_ops.vm_event_control, d, mode, op);
  }

-#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

  static inline int xsm_mem_access(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
  {
      return alternative_call(xsm_ops.mem_access, d);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index 8b7e01b506..96dc82ac2e 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber 
dummy_ops = {
      .remove_from_physmap           = xsm_remove_from_physmap,
      .map_gmfn_foreign              = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign,

+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

      .vm_event_control              = xsm_vm_event_control,

-#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

      .mem_access                    = xsm_mem_access,
  #endif

diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c

index b0308e1b26..9f3915617c 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -1365,12 +1365,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_hvm_altp2mhvm_op(struct 
domain *d, uint64_t mode, uint
      return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__ALTP2MHVM_OP);
  }

+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

  static int cf_check flask_vm_event_control(struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
  {
      return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__VM_EVENT);
  }

-#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

  static int cf_check flask_mem_access(struct domain *d)
  {
      return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__MEM_ACCESS);
@@ -1967,9 +1967,9 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber 
flask_ops = {
      .do_xsm_op = do_flask_op,
      .get_vnumainfo = flask_get_vnumainfo,

+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

      .vm_event_control = flask_vm_event_control,

-#ifdef CONFIG_VM_EVENT

      .mem_access = flask_mem_access,
  #endif

Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

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