[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/hvm: fix handling of accesses to partial r/o MMIO pages


  • To: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2025 17:38:54 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 17 Apr 2025 15:39:06 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 17.04.2025 17:25, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
> @@ -370,7 +370,15 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io(
>          /* If there is no suitable backing DM, just ignore accesses */
>          if ( !s )
>          {
> -            if ( is_mmio && is_hardware_domain(currd) )
> +            if ( is_mmio && is_hardware_domain(currd) &&
> +                 /*
> +                  * Do not attempt to fixup write accesses to r/o MMIO 
> regions,
> +                  * they are expected to be terminated by the null handler
> +                  * below.
> +                  */
> +                 (!rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges,
> +                                               PFN_DOWN(addr)) ||
> +                  dir == IOREQ_READ) )

These two would better be swapped, for the cheap one to be done first.

> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mmio.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * MMIO related routines.
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2025 Cloud Software Group
> + */
> +
> +#include <xen/io.h>
> +#include <xen/mm.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/p2m.h>
> +
> +static int cf_check subpage_mmio_accept(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +    p2m_type_t t;
> +    mfn_t mfn = get_gfn_query_unlocked(v->domain, PFN_DOWN(addr), &t);
> +
> +    return !mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) && t == p2m_mmio_direct &&
> +           subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * The guest has read access to those regions, and consequently read accesses
> + * shouldn't fault.  However read-modify-write operations may take this path,
> + * so handling of reads is necessary.
> + */
> +static int cf_check subpage_mmio_read(
> +    struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr, unsigned int len, unsigned long 
> *data)
> +{
> +    struct domain *d = v->domain;
> +    unsigned long gfn = PFN_DOWN(addr);
> +    p2m_type_t t;
> +    mfn_t mfn;
> +    struct subpage_ro_range *entry;
> +    volatile void __iomem *mem;
> +
> +    *data = ~0UL;
> +
> +    if ( !IS_ALIGNED(len | addr, len) )

What's the point of doing the | ? len can't be misaligned with itself?

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h
> @@ -554,6 +554,18 @@ int cf_check mmio_ro_emulated_write(
>      enum x86_segment seg, unsigned long offset, void *p_data,
>      unsigned int bytes, struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
>  
> +/* r/o MMIO subpage access handlers. */
> +struct subpage_ro_range {
> +    struct list_head list;
> +    mfn_t mfn;
> +    void __iomem *mapped;
> +    DECLARE_BITMAP(ro_elems, PAGE_SIZE / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN);
> +};
> +struct subpage_ro_range *subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn_t mfn);
> +void __iomem *subpage_mmio_map_page(struct subpage_ro_range *entry);

I notice you didn't move the __iomem, which - as indicated - I agree with,
but Andrew didn't. Did you sort this with him privately?

Jan



 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.