[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/PV: further harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse
On Thu, Jan 23, 2025 at 01:44:34PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 23.01.2025 12:54, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 02:56:42PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> The original implementation has two issues: For one it doesn't preserve > >> non-canonical-ness of inputs in the range 0x8000000000000000 through > >> 0x80007fffffffffff. Bogus guest pointers in that range would not cause a > >> (#GP) fault upon access, when they should. > >> > >> And then there is an AMD-specific aspect, where only the low 48 bits of > >> an address are used for speculative execution; the architecturally > >> mandated #GP for non-canonical addresses would be raised at a later > >> execution stage. Therefore to prevent Xen controlled data to make it > >> into any of the caches in a guest controllable manner, we need to > >> additionally ensure that for non-canonical inputs bit 47 would be clear. > >> > >> See the code comment for how addressing both is being achieved. > >> > >> Fixes: 4dc181599142 ("x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against > >> speculative abuse") > >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > >> --- > >> RFC: Two variants of part of the logic are being presented, both with > >> certain undesirable aspects: The first form is pretty large and > >> ugly (some improvement may be possible by introducing further > >> helper macros). The alternative form continues to use RCR, which > >> generally would be nice to do away with. Then again that's also > >> slightly smaller generated code. > > > > Oh, I assume that's why there's a hardcoded .if 1, I was wondering > > about that. What's the specific issue with using rcr? > > It's slower than SHL. Albeit - checking a few places - not as much as I > thought I remembered it would be. > > > And why is the > > more complex set of macros that use setc plus a shl better? > > They're slightly longer (beyond the source complexity), but (presumably) > a little faster. > > > Why not use cmovc: > > > > mov $(1 << 63), \scratch1 > > cmovc \scratch1, \scratch2 > > > > AFAICT \scratch1 is not used past the btr instruction, and hence can > > be used for the cmovc? > > Such an alternative was already considered back at the time: > https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2021-02/msg01067.html. > Granted I was wrong there about needing a 3rd scratch register, but > the code size consideration remains - we have dozens of instances of > this macro in the resulting binary, after all. Yet ftaod, this isn't > to mean we can't re-consider. Given the above I'm inclined though to > go the RCR route. RCR or CMOVC would either be fine by me. The SETC is IMO too complex, and using it would need a clear performance justification compared to RCR or CMOVC. Thanks, Roger.
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