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Re: [PATCH] x86/PV: further harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse



On Thu, Jan 23, 2025 at 01:44:34PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 23.01.2025 12:54, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 02:56:42PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> The original implementation has two issues: For one it doesn't preserve
> >> non-canonical-ness of inputs in the range 0x8000000000000000 through
> >> 0x80007fffffffffff. Bogus guest pointers in that range would not cause a
> >> (#GP) fault upon access, when they should.
> >>
> >> And then there is an AMD-specific aspect, where only the low 48 bits of
> >> an address are used for speculative execution; the architecturally
> >> mandated #GP for non-canonical addresses would be raised at a later
> >> execution stage. Therefore to prevent Xen controlled data to make it
> >> into any of the caches in a guest controllable manner, we need to
> >> additionally ensure that for non-canonical inputs bit 47 would be clear.
> >>
> >> See the code comment for how addressing both is being achieved.
> >>
> >> Fixes: 4dc181599142 ("x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against 
> >> speculative abuse")
> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >> RFC: Two variants of part of the logic are being presented, both with
> >>      certain undesirable aspects: The first form is pretty large and
> >>      ugly (some improvement may be possible by introducing further
> >>      helper macros). The alternative form continues to use RCR, which
> >>      generally would be nice to do away with. Then again that's also
> >>      slightly smaller generated code.
> > 
> > Oh, I assume that's why there's a hardcoded .if 1, I was wondering
> > about that.  What's the specific issue with using rcr?
> 
> It's slower than SHL. Albeit - checking a few places - not as much as I
> thought I remembered it would be.
> 
> >  And why is the
> > more complex set of macros that use setc plus a shl better?
> 
> They're slightly longer (beyond the source complexity), but (presumably)
> a little faster.
> 
> > Why not use cmovc:
> > 
> > mov $(1 << 63), \scratch1
> > cmovc \scratch1, \scratch2
> > 
> > AFAICT \scratch1 is not used past the btr instruction, and hence can
> > be used for the cmovc?
> 
> Such an alternative was already considered back at the time:
> https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2021-02/msg01067.html.
> Granted I was wrong there about needing a 3rd scratch register, but
> the code size consideration remains - we have dozens of instances of
> this macro in the resulting binary, after all. Yet ftaod, this isn't
> to mean we can't re-consider. Given the above I'm inclined though to
> go the RCR route.

RCR or CMOVC would either be fine by me.  The SETC is IMO too complex,
and using it would need a clear performance justification compared to
RCR or CMOVC.

Thanks, Roger.



 


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