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Re: [PATCH] x86/PV: further harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse


  • To: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 13:44:34 +0100
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  • Cc: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 12:44:39 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 23.01.2025 12:54, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2024 at 02:56:42PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> The original implementation has two issues: For one it doesn't preserve
>> non-canonical-ness of inputs in the range 0x8000000000000000 through
>> 0x80007fffffffffff. Bogus guest pointers in that range would not cause a
>> (#GP) fault upon access, when they should.
>>
>> And then there is an AMD-specific aspect, where only the low 48 bits of
>> an address are used for speculative execution; the architecturally
>> mandated #GP for non-canonical addresses would be raised at a later
>> execution stage. Therefore to prevent Xen controlled data to make it
>> into any of the caches in a guest controllable manner, we need to
>> additionally ensure that for non-canonical inputs bit 47 would be clear.
>>
>> See the code comment for how addressing both is being achieved.
>>
>> Fixes: 4dc181599142 ("x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against 
>> speculative abuse")
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> RFC: Two variants of part of the logic are being presented, both with
>>      certain undesirable aspects: The first form is pretty large and
>>      ugly (some improvement may be possible by introducing further
>>      helper macros). The alternative form continues to use RCR, which
>>      generally would be nice to do away with. Then again that's also
>>      slightly smaller generated code.
> 
> Oh, I assume that's why there's a hardcoded .if 1, I was wondering
> about that.  What's the specific issue with using rcr?

It's slower than SHL. Albeit - checking a few places - not as much as I
thought I remembered it would be.

>  And why is the
> more complex set of macros that use setc plus a shl better?

They're slightly longer (beyond the source complexity), but (presumably)
a little faster.

> Why not use cmovc:
> 
> mov $(1 << 63), \scratch1
> cmovc \scratch1, \scratch2
> 
> AFAICT \scratch1 is not used past the btr instruction, and hence can
> be used for the cmovc?

Such an alternative was already considered back at the time:
https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2021-02/msg01067.html.
Granted I was wrong there about needing a 3rd scratch register, but
the code size consideration remains - we have dozens of instances of
this macro in the resulting binary, after all. Yet ftaod, this isn't
to mean we can't re-consider. Given the above I'm inclined though to
go the RCR route.

Jan



 


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