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Re: [XEN PATCH v2 07/13] x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3


  • To: Federico Serafini <federico.serafini@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 17:32:04 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: consulting@xxxxxxxxxxx, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 15:32:29 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 24.06.2024 11:04, Federico Serafini wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
> @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io(
>      }
>      case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED:
>          ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> -        /* Fall-through */
> +        fallthrough;
>      default:
>          BUG();
>      }

This or very similar comment are replaced elsewhere in this patch. I'm
sure we have more of them. Hence an alternative would be to deviate those
variations of what we already deviate. I recall there was a mail from
Julien asking to avoid extending the set, unless some forms are used
pretty frequently. Sadly nothing towards judgement between the
alternatives is said in the description.

> @@ -2674,6 +2674,7 @@ static int _hvm_emulate_one(struct hvm_emulate_ctxt 
> *hvmemul_ctxt,
>  
>      default:
>          ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> +        break;
>      }
>  
>      if ( hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt.retire.singlestep )
> @@ -2764,6 +2765,7 @@ int hvm_emulate_one_mmio(unsigned long mfn, unsigned 
> long gla)
>          /* fallthrough */

What about this? It doesn't match anything I see in deviations.rst.

>      default:
>          hvm_emulate_writeback(&ctxt);
> +        break;
>      }
>  
>      return rc;
> @@ -2799,10 +2801,11 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, 
> unsigned int trapnr,
>          memcpy(hvio->mmio_insn, curr->arch.vm_event->emul.insn.data,
>                 hvio->mmio_insn_bytes);
>      }
> -    /* Fall-through */
> +    fallthrough;
>      default:
>          ctx.set_context = (kind == EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT_DATA);
>          rc = hvm_emulate_one(&ctx, VIO_no_completion);
> +        break;
>      }

While not as much of a problem for the comment, I view a statement like
this as mis-indented.

> @@ -5283,6 +5287,8 @@ void hvm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum 
> x86_segment seg,
>           * %cs and %tr are unconditionally present.  SVM ignores these 
> present
>           * bits and will happily run without them set.
>           */
> +        fallthrough;
> +
>      case x86_seg_cs:
>          reg->p = 1;
>          break;

Why the extra blank line here, ...

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
> @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ int hvm_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>      case 8:
>          eax = regs->rax;
>          /* Fallthrough to permission check. */
> +        fallthrough;
>      case 4:
>      case 2:
>          if ( currd->arch.monitor.guest_request_userspace_enabled &&

... when e.g. here there's none? I'm afraid this goes back to an
unfinished discussion as to whether to have blank lines between blocks
in fall-through situations. My view is that not having them in these
cases is helping to make the falling through visually noticeable.

Jan



 


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