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[XEN PATCH v2 07/13] x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3



MISRA C Rule 16.3 states that "An unconditional `break' statement shall
terminate every switch-clause".

Add pseudo keyword fallthrough or missing break statement
to address violations of the rule.

As a defensive measure, return -EOPNOTSUPP in case an unreachable
return statement is reached.

Signed-off-by: Federico Serafini <federico.serafini@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes in v2:
- replace hypened fallthrough with the pseudo keyword.
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c   | 9 ++++++---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c       | 6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c       | 1 +
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
index 02e378365b..859c21a5ab 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io(
     }
     case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
-        /* Fall-through */
+        fallthrough;
     default:
         BUG();
     }
@@ -2674,6 +2674,7 @@ static int _hvm_emulate_one(struct hvm_emulate_ctxt 
*hvmemul_ctxt,
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        break;
     }
 
     if ( hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt.retire.singlestep )
@@ -2764,6 +2765,7 @@ int hvm_emulate_one_mmio(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long 
gla)
         /* fallthrough */
     default:
         hvm_emulate_writeback(&ctxt);
+        break;
     }
 
     return rc;
@@ -2799,10 +2801,11 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, 
unsigned int trapnr,
         memcpy(hvio->mmio_insn, curr->arch.vm_event->emul.insn.data,
                hvio->mmio_insn_bytes);
     }
-    /* Fall-through */
+    fallthrough;
     default:
         ctx.set_context = (kind == EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT_DATA);
         rc = hvm_emulate_one(&ctx, VIO_no_completion);
+        break;
     }
 
     switch ( rc )
@@ -2818,7 +2821,7 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, 
unsigned int trapnr,
     case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED:
         if ( hvm_monitor_emul_unimplemented() )
             return;
-        /* fall-through */
+        fallthrough;
     case X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE:
         hvm_dump_emulation_state(XENLOG_G_DEBUG, "Mem event", &ctx, rc);
         hvm_inject_hw_exception(trapnr, errcode);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 7f4b627b1f..c263e562ff 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4919,6 +4919,8 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        break;
     }
 
  out:
@@ -5020,6 +5022,8 @@ static int compat_altp2m_op(
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        break;
     }
 
     return rc;
@@ -5283,6 +5287,8 @@ void hvm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum 
x86_segment seg,
          * %cs and %tr are unconditionally present.  SVM ignores these present
          * bits and will happily run without them set.
          */
+        fallthrough;
+
     case x86_seg_cs:
         reg->p = 1;
         break;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
index 7fb3136f0c..2271afe02a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ int hvm_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
     case 8:
         eax = regs->rax;
         /* Fallthrough to permission check. */
+        fallthrough;
     case 4:
     case 2:
         if ( currd->arch.monitor.guest_request_userspace_enabled &&
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
index 210cebb0e6..1eab44defc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ static void hvm_set_callback_irq_level(struct vcpu *v)
             __hvm_pci_intx_assert(d, pdev, pintx);
         else
             __hvm_pci_intx_deassert(d, pdev, pintx);
+        break;
     default:
         break;
     }
-- 
2.34.1




 


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