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Re: [XEN PATCH v10 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi


  • To: "Chen, Jiqian" <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 11:23:06 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Daniel P . Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Hildebrand, Stewart" <Stewart.Hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, "Huang, Ray" <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 09:23:15 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 18.06.2024 10:23, Chen, Jiqian wrote:
> On 2024/6/17 23:32, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 17.06.2024 11:00, Jiqian Chen wrote:
>>> @@ -1516,14 +1519,39 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
>>>              rc = ERROR_FAIL;
>>>              goto out;
>>>          }
>>> -        r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1);
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86
>>> +        /* If dom0 doesn't have PIRQs, need to use 
>>> xc_domain_gsi_permission */
>>> +        r = xc_domain_getinfo_single(ctx->xch, 0, &info);
>>
>> Hard-coded 0 is imposing limitations. Ideally you would use DOMID_SELF, but
>> I didn't check if that can be used with the underlying hypercall(s). 
>> Otherwise
>> you want to pass the actual domid of the local domain here.
> But the action of granting permission is from dom0 to domU, what I need to 
> get is the infomation of dom0,
> The actual domid here is domU's id I think, it is not useful.

Note how I said DOMID_SELF and "local domain". There's no talk of using the
DomU's domid. But what you apparently neglect is the fact that the hardware
domain isn't necessarily Dom0 (see CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM in the hypervisor).
While benign in most cases, this is relevant when it comes to referencing
the hardware domain by domid. And it is the hardware domain which is going
to drive the device re-assignment, as that domain is who's in possession of
all the devices not yet assigned to any DomU.

>>> @@ -237,6 +238,48 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
>>>          break;
>>>      }
>>>  
>>> +    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
>>> +    {
>>> +        unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi;
>>> +        int irq;
>>> +        bool allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access;
>>
>> See my earlier comments on this conversion of 8 bits into just one.
> Do you mean that I need to check allow_access is >= 0?
> But allow_access is u8, it can't be negative.

Right. What I can only re-iterate from earlier commenting is that you
want to check for 0 or 1 (can be viewed as looking at just the low bit),
rejecting everything else. It is only this way that down the road we
could assign meaning to the other bits, without risking to break existing
callers. That's the same as the requirement to check padding fields to be
zero.

Jan



 


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