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[XEN PATCH v10 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi


  • To: <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 17:00:35 +0800
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  • Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Juergen Gross" <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Daniel P . Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stewart Hildebrand <Stewart.Hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>, Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 09:01:23 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Some type of domain don't have PIRQs, like PVH, it doesn't do
PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq for each gsi. When passthrough a device
to guest base on PVH dom0, callstack
pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will fail at function
domain_pirq_to_irq, because PVH has no mapping of gsi, pirq and
irq on Xen side.
What's more, current hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission requires
passing in pirq, it is not suitable for dom0 that doesn't have
PIRQs.

So, add a new hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant the
permission of irq(translate from gsi) to dumU when dom0 has no
PIRQs.

Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
---
RFC: it needs review and needs to wait for the corresponding third patch on 
linux kernel side to be merged.
---
 tools/include/xenctrl.h            |  5 +++
 tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c        | 15 +++++++
 tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c       | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c              | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h |  2 +
 xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c             | 17 ++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c             |  3 +-
 xen/include/public/domctl.h        |  8 ++++
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c              |  1 +
 9 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
index a0381f74d24b..f3feb6848e25 100644
--- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                              uint32_t pirq,
                              bool allow_access);
 
+int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch,
+                             uint32_t domid,
+                             uint32_t gsi,
+                             bool allow_access);
+
 int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                                uint32_t domid,
                                unsigned long first_mfn,
diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
index f2d9d14b4d9f..8540e84fda93 100644
--- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
@@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch,
     return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
 }
 
+int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch,
+                             uint32_t domid,
+                             uint32_t gsi,
+                             bool allow_access)
+{
+    struct xen_domctl domctl = {
+        .cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission,
+        .domain = domid,
+        .u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi,
+        .u.gsi_permission.allow_access = allow_access,
+    };
+
+    return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
+}
+
 int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                                uint32_t domid,
                                unsigned long first_mfn,
diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
index 376f91759ac6..f027f22c0028 100644
--- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
@@ -1431,6 +1431,9 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
     uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED;
     uint32_t domainid = domid;
     bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+    xc_domaininfo_t info;
+#endif
 
     /* Convenience aliases */
     bool starting = pas->starting;
@@ -1516,14 +1519,39 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
             rc = ERROR_FAIL;
             goto out;
         }
-        r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+        /* If dom0 doesn't have PIRQs, need to use xc_domain_gsi_permission */
+        r = xc_domain_getinfo_single(ctx->xch, 0, &info);
         if (r < 0) {
-            LOGED(ERROR, domainid,
-                  "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, r);
+            LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "getdomaininfo failed (error=%d)", errno);
             fclose(f);
             rc = ERROR_FAIL;
             goto out;
         }
+        if (info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest &&
+            !(info.arch_config.emulation_flags & XEN_X86_EMU_USE_PIRQ) &&
+            gsi > 0) {
+            r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, 1);
+            if (r < 0) {
+                LOGED(ERROR, domainid,
+                    "xc_domain_gsi_permission gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno);
+                fclose(f);
+                rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+            }
+        }
+        else
+#endif
+        {
+            r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+            if (r < 0) {
+                LOGED(ERROR, domainid,
+                    "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, errno);
+                fclose(f);
+                rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+            }
+        }
     }
     fclose(f);
 
@@ -2200,6 +2228,10 @@ static void pci_remove_detached(libxl__egc *egc,
 #endif
     uint32_t domainid = prs->domid;
     bool isstubdom;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+    int r;
+    xc_domaininfo_t info;
+#endif
 
     /* Convenience aliases */
     libxl_device_pci *const pci = &prs->pci;
@@ -2287,9 +2319,32 @@ skip_bar:
              */
             LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_unmap_pirq irq=%d", irq);
         }
-        rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0);
-        if (rc < 0) {
-            LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+        /* If dom0 doesn't have PIRQs, need to use xc_domain_gsi_permission */
+        r = xc_domain_getinfo_single(ctx->xch, 0, &info);
+        if (r < 0) {
+            LOGED(ERROR, domid, "getdomaininfo failed (error=%d)", errno);
+            fclose(f);
+            rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+            goto skip_legacy_irq;
+        }
+        if (info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest &&
+            !(info.arch_config.emulation_flags & XEN_X86_EMU_USE_PIRQ) &&
+            gsi > 0) {
+            r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, 0);
+            if (r < 0) {
+                LOGED(ERROR, domid,
+                    "xc_domain_gsi_permission gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, errno);
+                rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+            }
+        }
+        else
+#endif
+        {
+            rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0);
+            if (rc < 0) {
+                LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq);
+            }
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 335aedf46d03..6b465bbc6ec0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <asm/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/psr.h>
 #include <asm/cpu-policy.h>
+#include <asm/io_apic.h>
 
 static int update_domain_cpu_policy(struct domain *d,
                                     xen_domctl_cpu_policy_t *xdpc)
@@ -237,6 +238,48 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         break;
     }
 
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+    {
+        unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi;
+        int irq;
+        bool allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access;
+
+        /* Check all pads are zero */
+        ret = -EINVAL;
+        for ( i = 0;
+              i < sizeof(domctl->u.gsi_permission.pad) /
+                  sizeof(domctl->u.gsi_permission.pad[0]);
+              ++i )
+            if ( domctl->u.gsi_permission.pad[i] )
+                goto out;
+
+        /*
+         * If current domain is PV or it has PIRQ flag, it has a mapping
+         * of gsi, pirq and irq, so it should use XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission
+         * to grant irq permission.
+         */
+        ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        if ( is_pv_domain(currd) || has_pirq(currd) )
+            goto out;
+
+        ret = -EINVAL;
+        if ( gsi >= nr_irqs_gsi || (irq = gsi_2_irq(gsi)) < 0 )
+            goto out;
+
+        ret = -EPERM;
+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) ||
+             xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) )
+            goto out;
+
+        if ( allow )
+            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+        else
+            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+
+    out:
+        break;
+    }
+
     case XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3:
     {
         unsigned int num = domctl->u.getpageframeinfo3.num;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h 
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h
index 78268ea8f666..7e86d8337758 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h
@@ -213,5 +213,7 @@ unsigned highest_gsi(void);
 
 int ioapic_guest_read( unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 *pval);
 int ioapic_guest_write(unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 val);
+int mp_find_ioapic(int gsi);
+int gsi_2_irq(int gsi);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
index b48a64246548..23845c8cb11f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c
@@ -955,6 +955,23 @@ static int pin_2_irq(int idx, int apic, int pin)
     return irq;
 }
 
+int gsi_2_irq(int gsi)
+{
+    int ioapic, pin, irq;
+
+    ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi);
+    if ( ioapic < 0 )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    pin = gsi - io_apic_gsi_base(ioapic);
+
+    irq = apic_pin_2_gsi_irq(ioapic, pin);
+    if ( irq <= 0 )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    return irq;
+}
+
 static inline int IO_APIC_irq_trigger(int irq)
 {
     int apic, idx, pin;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
index d8ccab2449c6..c95da0de5770 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c
@@ -841,8 +841,7 @@ static struct mp_ioapic_routing {
 } mp_ioapic_routing[MAX_IO_APICS];
 
 
-static int mp_find_ioapic (
-       int                     gsi)
+int mp_find_ioapic(int gsi)
 {
        unsigned int            i;
 
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index 2a49fe46ce25..f7ae8b19d27d 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -464,6 +464,12 @@ struct xen_domctl_irq_permission {
     uint8_t pad[3];
 };
 
+/* XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission */
+struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission {
+    uint32_t gsi;
+    uint8_t allow_access;    /* flag to specify enable/disable of x86 gsi 
access */
+    uint8_t pad[3];
+};
 
 /* XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission */
 struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission {
@@ -1306,6 +1312,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_paging_mempool_size       85
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_paging_mempool_size       86
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_dt_overlay                    87
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission                88
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio            1000
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu             1001
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu           1002
@@ -1328,6 +1335,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
         struct xen_domctl_setdomainhandle   setdomainhandle;
         struct xen_domctl_setdebugging      setdebugging;
         struct xen_domctl_irq_permission    irq_permission;
+        struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission    gsi_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission  iomem_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_ioport_permission ioport_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_hypercall_init    hypercall_init;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 5e88c71b8e22..a5b134c91101 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
     /*
-- 
2.34.1




 


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