[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [XEN PATCH v2 12/15] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code


  • To: Sergiy Kibrik <sergiy_kibrik@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 14:16:41 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>, Xenia Ragiadakou <xenia.ragiadakou@xxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 29 May 2024 12:16:47 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 29.05.2024 12:58, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> 16.05.24 10:32, Jan Beulich:
>> On 16.05.2024 02:50, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>> On Wed, 15 May 2024, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
>>>> There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx,
>>>> where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking if VMX present first.
>>>> We may want to guard these macros, as they read global variables defined
>>>> inside vmx-specific files -- so VMX can be made optional later on.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx>
>>>> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> Here I've tried a different approach from prev.patches [1,2] -- instead of
>>>> modifying whole set of cpu_has_{svm/vmx}_* macros, we can:
>>>>   1) do not touch SVM part at all, because just as Andrew pointed out 
>>>> they're
>>>> used inside arch/x86/hvm/svm only.
>>>>   2) track several places in common code where cpu_has_vmx_* features are
>>>> checked out and guard them using cpu_has_vmx condition
>>>>   3) two of cpu_has_vmx_* macros being used in common code are checked in 
>>>> a bit
>>>> more tricky way, so instead of making complex conditionals even more 
>>>> complicated,
>>>> we can instead integrate cpu_has_vmx condition inside these two macros.
>>>>
>>>> This patch aims to replace [1,2] from v1 series by doing steps above.
>>>>
> [..]
>>>
>>> I am missing some of the previous discussions but why can't we just fix
>>> all of the cpu_has_vmx_* #defines in vmcs.h to also check for
>>> cpu_has_vmx?
>>>
>>> That seems easier and simpler than to add add-hoc checks at the invocations?
>>
>> I'd like to take the question on step further: Following 0b5f149338e3
>> ("x86/HVM: hide SVM/VMX when their enabling is prohibited by firmware"),
>> is this change needed at all? IOW is there a path left where cpu_has_vmx
>> may be false, by any cpu_has_vmx_* may still yield true?
>>
> 
> This change is about exec control variables (vmx_secondary_exec_control, 
> vmx_pin_based_exec_control etc) not been built, because they're in vmx 
> code, but accessed in common code. The description is probably unclear 
> about that.
> Also build issues related to VMX can be solved differently, without 
> touching cpu_has_vmx_* macros and related logic at all.
> I can move exec control variables from vmcs.c to common hvm.c, this 
> would be simpler change and directly related to problem that I'm having.

That would be moving them one layer too high. Proper disentangling then
will need to wait until that data is actually part of the (host) CPU
policy. For the time being your change may thus be acceptable, assuming
that we won't be very quick in doing said move.

Jan



 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.