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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [XEN PATCH v2 12/15] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx,
where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking if VMX present first.
We may want to guard these macros, as they read global variables defined
inside vmx-specific files -- so VMX can be made optional later on.
Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
Here I've tried a different approach from prev.patches [1,2] -- instead of
modifying whole set of cpu_has_{svm/vmx}_* macros, we can:
1) do not touch SVM part at all, because just as Andrew pointed out they're
used inside arch/x86/hvm/svm only.
2) track several places in common code where cpu_has_vmx_* features are
checked out and guard them using cpu_has_vmx condition
3) two of cpu_has_vmx_* macros being used in common code are checked in a bit
more tricky way, so instead of making complex conditionals even more
complicated,
we can instead integrate cpu_has_vmx condition inside these two macros.
This patch aims to replace [1,2] from v1 series by doing steps above.
1.
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416064402.3469959-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/
2.
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416064606.3470052-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/
---
changes in v2:
- do not touch SVM code and macros
- drop vmx_ctrl_has_feature()
- guard cpu_has_vmx_* macros in common code instead
changes in v1:
- introduced helper routine vmx_ctrl_has_feature() and used it for all
cpu_has_vmx_* macros
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 9594e0a5c5..ab75de9779 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -5180,7 +5180,7 @@ int hvm_debug_op(struct vcpu *v, int32_t op)
{
case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON:
case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF:
- if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx || !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
default:
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
index 0496c52ed5..657c6a3ea7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t
leaf,
res->a = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT;
if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_remote_tlb_flush )
res->a |= CPUID4A_HCALL_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH;
- if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+ if ( !cpu_has_vmx || !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
res->a |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC;
if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_ipi )
res->a |= CPUID4A_SYNTHETIC_CLUSTER_IPI;
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t
leaf,
case 6:
/* Detected and in use hardware features. */
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx && cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
res->a |= CPUID6A_APIC_OVERLAY;
if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap || (read_efer() & EFER_SVME) )
res->a |= CPUID6A_MSR_BITMAPS;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index 58140af691..aa05f9cf6e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
#define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \
(vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
#define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \
- (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
+ (cpu_has_vmx && vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
#define cpu_has_vmx_secondary_exec_control \
(vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
#define cpu_has_vmx_tertiary_exec_control \
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
#define cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS)
#define cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions \
- (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS)
+ (cpu_has_vmx && vmx_secondary_exec_control &
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS)
#define cpu_has_vmx_pml \
(vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML)
#define cpu_has_vmx_mpx \
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 7b8ee45edf..3595bb379a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v,
uint32_t leaf,
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || subleaf != 0 )
break;
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx && cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
res->a |= XEN_HVM_CPUID_APIC_ACCESS_VIRT;
/*
@@ -1139,7 +1139,8 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v,
uint32_t leaf,
* and wrmsr in the guest will run without VMEXITs (see
* vmx_vlapic_msr_changed()).
*/
- if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode &&
+ if ( cpu_has_vmx &&
+ cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode &&
cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt &&
cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
res->a |= XEN_HVM_CPUID_X2APIC_VIRT;
--
2.25.1
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