[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [XEN PATCH v2 12/15] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx, where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking if VMX present first. We may want to guard these macros, as they read global variables defined inside vmx-specific files -- so VMX can be made optional later on. Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- Here I've tried a different approach from prev.patches [1,2] -- instead of modifying whole set of cpu_has_{svm/vmx}_* macros, we can: 1) do not touch SVM part at all, because just as Andrew pointed out they're used inside arch/x86/hvm/svm only. 2) track several places in common code where cpu_has_vmx_* features are checked out and guard them using cpu_has_vmx condition 3) two of cpu_has_vmx_* macros being used in common code are checked in a bit more tricky way, so instead of making complex conditionals even more complicated, we can instead integrate cpu_has_vmx condition inside these two macros. This patch aims to replace [1,2] from v1 series by doing steps above. 1. https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416064402.3469959-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/ 2. https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20240416064606.3470052-1-Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx/ --- changes in v2: - do not touch SVM code and macros - drop vmx_ctrl_has_feature() - guard cpu_has_vmx_* macros in common code instead changes in v1: - introduced helper routine vmx_ctrl_has_feature() and used it for all cpu_has_vmx_* macros --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c | 4 ++-- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 4 ++-- xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 9594e0a5c5..ab75de9779 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -5180,7 +5180,7 @@ int hvm_debug_op(struct vcpu *v, int32_t op) { case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON: case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF: - if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag ) + if ( !cpu_has_vmx || !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag ) return -EOPNOTSUPP; break; default: diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c index 0496c52ed5..657c6a3ea7 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf, res->a = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT; if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_remote_tlb_flush ) res->a |= CPUID4A_HCALL_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH; - if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) + if ( !cpu_has_vmx || !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) res->a |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC; if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_ipi ) res->a |= CPUID4A_SYNTHETIC_CLUSTER_IPI; @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf, case 6: /* Detected and in use hardware features. */ - if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses ) + if ( cpu_has_vmx && cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses ) res->a |= CPUID6A_APIC_OVERLAY; if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap || (read_efer() & EFER_SVME) ) res->a |= CPUID6A_MSR_BITMAPS; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h index 58140af691..aa05f9cf6e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap; #define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \ (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS) #define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \ - (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP) + (cpu_has_vmx && vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP) #define cpu_has_vmx_secondary_exec_control \ (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) #define cpu_has_vmx_tertiary_exec_control \ @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap; #define cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc \ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS) #define cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions \ - (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS) + (cpu_has_vmx && vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS) #define cpu_has_vmx_pml \ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML) #define cpu_has_vmx_mpx \ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c index 7b8ee45edf..3595bb379a 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf, if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || subleaf != 0 ) break; - if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) + if ( cpu_has_vmx && cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) res->a |= XEN_HVM_CPUID_APIC_ACCESS_VIRT; /* @@ -1139,7 +1139,8 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf, * and wrmsr in the guest will run without VMEXITs (see * vmx_vlapic_msr_changed()). */ - if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode && + if ( cpu_has_vmx && + cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode && cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt && cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) res->a |= XEN_HVM_CPUID_X2APIC_VIRT; -- 2.25.1
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