[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/ept: limit calls to memory_type_changed()
On Mon, Sep 26, 2022 at 09:33:10AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 23.09.2022 10:35, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2022 at 09:21:59PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 22.09.2022 18:05, Roger Pau Monne wrote: > >>> memory_type_changed() is currently only implemented for Intel EPT, and > >>> results in the invalidation of EMT attributes on all the entries in > >>> the EPT page tables. Such invalidation causes EPT_MISCONFIG vmexits > >>> when the guest tries to access any gfns for the first time, which > >>> results in the recalculation of the EMT for the accessed page. The > >>> vmexit and the recalculations are expensive, and as such should be > >>> avoided when possible. > >>> > >>> Remove the call to memory_type_changed() from > >>> XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping: there are no modifications of the > >>> iomem_caps ranges anymore that could alter the return of > >>> cache_flush_permitted() from that domctl. > >> > >> I certainly agree - this was an oversight when the two aspects were > >> split. One might argue this is a (performance) fix to the earlier > >> commit, and hence might want to go on its own with a Fixes: tag. > > > > Was wondering myself, didn't add the 'Fixes:' tag because of the extra > > content. > > > >>> Calls to memory_type_changed() resulting from changes to the domain > >>> iomem_caps or ioport_caps ranges are only relevant for EMT > >>> calculations if the IOMMU is not enabled, and the call has resulted in > >>> a change to the return value of cache_flush_permitted(). > >> > >> I'm less certain here: These shouldn't be frequent operations, so > >> their impact on the guest should be limited? > > > > Citrix has an use case for vGPU where IOMMU regions are added and > > removed during guest runtime. Such functionality makes uses of both > > XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission and XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping. > > I see. Maybe this would want saying in the description, to express > that there's little expected benefit for upstream. I guess any OS that moves BARs around will also trigger such code paths, but that might not be very common. I can add something to the description. > > While the memory_type_changed() call in XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping > > seems to be the most problematic performance wise, I though it was > > nice to try to avoid memory_type_changed() as much as possible, as > > those tax the guest quite heavily with EPT_MISCONFIG faults and the > > recalculation logic. > > Trying to avoid this is certainly desirable, I agree. But we need > to make sure that it's not "easy" to break things by touching one > place but leaving others alone which really would need keeping in > sync. Therefore I'd see such added logic as acceptable only if the > risk towards future changes is sufficiently low. > > >> And if we were to restrict the calls, I think we need to clearly > >> tie together the various places which need updating together in > >> case e.g. the condition in epte_get_entry_emt() is changed. > >> Minimally by way of comments, but maybe by way of a small helper > >> function (for which I can't seem to be able to think of a good > >> name) sitting next to epte_get_entry_emt(). > > > > Such helper function is also kind of problematic, as it would have to > > live in p2m-ept.c but be used in domctl.c and x86/domctl.c? It would > > have to go through the p2m_domain indirection structure. > > It would need abstraction at the arch level as well as for !HVM configs > on x86. I'm not sure the indirection layer would actually be needed, as > the contents of the function - despite wanting placing in p2m-ept.c - > isn't really vendor dependent. (If AMD/SVM gained a need for a similar > helper, things would nee re-evaluating.) Maybe it would be better to add the calls to memory_type_changed() directly in iomem_{permit,deny}_access() and ioports_{permit,deny}_access itself? That would also allow to remove the noop Arm memory_type_changed() halper. Thanks, Roger.
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