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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH] x86: Add MMIO Stale Data arch_caps to hardware domain
Let the hardware domain know about the hardware it is running on. This
allows a linux Dom0 to know that it has the appropriate microcode via
FB_CLEAR. /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
changes from:
"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode; SMT Host state
unknown"
to:
"Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT Host state unknown"
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Should calculate_host_policy()'s arch_caps mask also be updated? They
are not identical today, but I'm don't know this code to understand why
they differ.
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index c2c0025e3a..f1c36d423f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -163,7 +163,9 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d)
mp->arch_caps.raw = val &
(ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA |
- ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO);
+ ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO |
+ ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO |
+ ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR);
}
d->arch.msr = mp;
--
2.36.1
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