[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/hvm: Include interruptibility state in hvm_hw_cpu
On Thu, Mar 17, 2022 at 12:07 PM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On 17.03.2022 16:59, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 17, 2022 at 11:06 AM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> > >> On 17.03.2022 15:43, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > >>> On Thu, Mar 17, 2022 at 9:56 AM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>>> On 10.03.2022 19:44, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > >>>>> @@ -1155,6 +1154,8 @@ static int cf_check hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct > >>>>> domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) > >>>>> v->arch.dr6 = ctxt.dr6; > >>>>> v->arch.dr7 = ctxt.dr7; > >>>>> > >>>>> + hvm_set_interrupt_shadow(v, ctxt.interruptibility_info); > >>>> > >>>> Setting reserved bits as well as certain combinations of bits will > >>>> cause VM entry to fail. I think it would be nice to report this as > >>>> an error here rather than waiting for the VM entry failure. > >>> > >>> Not sure if this would be the right spot to do that since that's all > >>> VMX specific and this is the common hvm code. > >> > >> Well, it would be the VMX hook to do the checking, with an error > >> propagated back here. > > > > I'm actually against it because the overhead of that error-checking > > during vm forking would be significant with really no benefit. We are > > copying the state from the parent where it was running fine before, so > > doing that sanity checking thousands of times per second when we > > already know its fine is bad. > > I can see your point, but my concern is not forking but normal migration > or restoring of guests, where the incoming data is of effectively > unknown origin. IMHO for that route the error checking is better performed at the toolstack level that sends the data to Xen. Tamas
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