[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 2/3] amd/msr: allow passthrough of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests
Allow HVM guests untrapped access to MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if the hardware has support for it. This requires adding logic in the vm{entry,exit} paths for SVM in order to context switch between the hypervisor value and the guest one. The added handlers for context switch will also be used for the legacy SSBD support. Introduce a new synthetic feature leaf (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) to signal whether VIRT_SPEC_CTRL needs to be handled on guest vm{entry,exit}. Note the change in the handling of VIRT_SSBD in the featureset description. The change from 's' to 'S' is due to the fact that now if VIRT_SSBD is exposed by the hardware it can be passed through to HVM guests. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Changes since v1: - Introduce virt_spec_ctrl vCPU field. - Context switch VIRT_SPEC_CTRL on vmentry/vmexit separately from SPEC_CTRL. --- xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 11 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 6 ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 10 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 9 ++++- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c index 4ca77ea870..91e53284fc 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c @@ -534,6 +534,10 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void) raw_cpuid_policy.basic.sep ) __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, hvm_featureset); + if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) ) + /* Clear VIRT_SSBD if VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is not exposed to guests. */ + __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD, hvm_featureset); + /* * If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests (functional * availability, or admin choice), hide the feature. @@ -590,6 +594,13 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) guest_common_feature_adjustments(hvm_featureset); guest_common_default_feature_adjustments(hvm_featureset); + /* + * AMD_SSBD if preferred over VIRT_SSBD, so don't expose the later by + * default if the former is available. + */ + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) ) + __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD, hvm_featureset); + sanitise_featureset(hvm_featureset); cpuid_featureset_to_policy(hvm_featureset, p); recalculate_xstate(p); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S index 4ae55a2ef6..e2c104bb1e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S @@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) clgi + ALTERNATIVE "", STR(call vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl), \ + X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */ /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_SVM Req: b=curr %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ .macro svm_vmentry_spec_ctrl @@ -114,6 +117,9 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + ALTERNATIVE "", STR(call vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl), \ + X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM + stgi GLOBAL(svm_stgi_label) mov %rsp,%rdi diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c index 64a45045da..73a0af599b 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include <asm/hvm/svm/svmdebug.h> #include <asm/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.h> #include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h> #include <asm/x86_emulate.h> #include <public/sched.h> #include <asm/hvm/vpt.h> @@ -610,6 +611,14 @@ static void cf_check svm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v) svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, cp->extd.ibrs ? MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE : MSR_INTERCEPT_RW); + /* + * Give access to MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if the guest has been told about it + * and the hardware implements it. + */ + svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, + cp->extd.virt_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ? + MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE : MSR_INTERCEPT_RW); + /* Give access to MSR_PRED_CMD if the guest has been told about it. */ svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_PRED_CMD, cp->extd.ibpb ? MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE : MSR_INTERCEPT_RW); @@ -3105,6 +3114,36 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) vmcb_set_vintr(vmcb, intr); } +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void) +{ + unsigned int val = opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0; + + if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) + { + unsigned int lo, hi; + + /* + * Need to read from the hardware because VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is not context + * switched by the hardware, and we allow the guest untrapped access to + * the register. + */ + rdmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, lo, hi); + if ( val != lo ) + wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0); + current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw = lo; + } +} + +/* Called with GIF=0. */ +void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void) +{ + unsigned int val = current->arch.msrs->virt_spec_ctrl.raw; + + if ( val != (opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0) ) + wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0); +} + /* * Local variables: * mode: C diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 7413febd7a..2240547b64 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM, X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM, X86_SYNTH(28)) /* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL exposed to HVM */ /* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */ #define X86_NR_BUG 1 diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h index ab6fbb5051..460aabe84f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h @@ -375,6 +375,16 @@ struct vcpu_msrs */ uint32_t tsc_aux; + /* + * 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if !X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) + * + * AMD only. Guest selected value, saved and restored on guest VM + * entry/exit. + */ + struct { + uint32_t raw; + } virt_spec_ctrl; + /* * 0xc00110{27,19-1b} MSR_AMD64_DR{0-3}_ADDRESS_MASK * diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index f338bfe292..0d5ec877d1 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -406,9 +406,12 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM) || opt_eager_fpu) ? "" : " None", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "", - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ? " MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" : "", + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM)) ? " MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL" + : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ? " RSB" : "", opt_eager_fpu ? " EAGER_FPU" : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : ""); @@ -1069,6 +1072,10 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM); } + /* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */ + if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM); + /* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */ if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs ) default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h index b797c6bea1..0639b9faf2 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRS_SAME_MODE, 8*32+19) /*S IBRS provides same-mode protection XEN_CPUFEATURE(NO_LMSL, 8*32+20) /*S EFER.LMSLE no longer supported. */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_PPIN, 8*32+23) /* Protected Processor Inventory Number */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_SSBD, 8*32+24) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /*!s MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /*!S MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO, 8*32+26) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSFD, 8*32+28) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */ -- 2.34.1
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