[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 4/4] xen/x86: Allow stubdom access to irq created for msi.
On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 04:41:26AM +0200, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > Stubdomains need to be given sufficient privilege over the guest which it > provides emulation for in order for PCI passthrough to work correctly. > When a HVM domain try to enable MSI, QEMU in stubdomain calls > PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq, but later it needs to call XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq as > part of xc_domain_update_msi_irq. Allow for that as part of > PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq. I would replace the last sentence with: "Give the stubdomain enough permissions over the mapped interrupt in order to bind it successfully to it's target domain." > > This is not needed for PCI INTx, because IRQ in that case is known > beforehand and the stubdomain is given permissions over this IRQ by > libxl__device_pci_add (there's a do_pci_add against the stubdomain). > > create_irq() already grant IRQ access to hardware_domain, with > assumption the device model (something managing this IRQ) lives there. I would remove the "(something managing this IRQ)", I think it makes the sentence harder to understand while not adding any valuable information. > Modify create_irq() to take additional parameter pointing at device > model domain - which may be dom0 or stubdomain. Save ID of the domain > given permission, to revoke it in destroy_irq() - easier and cleaner > than replaying logic of create_irq() parameter. Use domid instead of > actual reference to the domain, because it might get destroyed before > destroying IRQ (stubdomain is destroyed before its target domain). And > it is not an issue, because IRQ permissions live within domain > structure, so destroying a domain also implicitly revoke the permission. > Potential domid reuse is detected by by checking if that domain does ^ double by > have permission over the IRQ being destroyed. > > Then, adjust all callers to provide the parameter. In case of calls not > related to stubdomain-initiated allocations, give it either > hardware_domain (so the behavior is unchanged there), or NULL for > interrupts used by Xen internally. > > Inspired by > https://github.com/OpenXT/xenclient-oe/blob/5e0e7304a5a3c75ef01240a1e3673665b2aaf05e/recipes-extended/xen/files/stubdomain-msi-irq-access.patch > by Eric Chanudet <chanudete@xxxxxxxxxxxx>. > > Signed-off-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> I have some minor comments below, but the patch LGTM, so: Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> It would still be nice to get the missing bits (interrupt enabling), or else this patch is kind of pointless, since it still doesn't allow stubdomains to work correctly with passed through devices. > --- > Changes in v3: > - extend commit message > Changes in v4: > - add missing destroy_irq on error path > Changes in v5: > - move irq_{grant,revoke}_access() to {create,destroy}_irq(), which > basically make it a different patch > - add get_dm_domain() helper > - do not give hardware_domain permission over IRQs used in Xen > internally > - rename create_irq argument to just 'd', to avoid confusion > when it's called by hardware domain > - verify that device is de-assigned before pci_remove_device call > - save ID of domain given permission in create_irq(), to revoke it in > destroy_irq() > - drop domain parameter from destroy_irq() and msi_free_irq() > - do not give hardware domain permission over IRQ created in > iommu_set_interrupt() > Changes in v6: > - do not give permission over hpet irq to hardware_domain > - move creator_domid to arch_irq_desc > - fix creator_domid initialization > - always give current->domain permission instead of using > get_dm_domain() helper. Analysis of all its use cases tells that it is > the only value it returns. > - drop unrelated change > Changes in v7: > - Code style improvements (spaces, use %pd etc) > - use bool parameter to create_irq, as it's only getting > current->domain or NULL > - remove redundant irq_access_permitted() > --- > xen/arch/x86/hpet.c | 3 +- > xen/arch/x86/irq.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++-------- > xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c | 2 +- > xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c | 2 +- > xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 3 +- > xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h | 7 +++- > 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c > index 4b08488..57f68fa 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include <xen/softirq.h> > #include <xen/irq.h> > #include <xen/numa.h> > +#include <xen/sched.h> > #include <asm/fixmap.h> > #include <asm/div64.h> > #include <asm/hpet.h> > @@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ static int __init hpet_assign_irq(struct > hpet_event_channel *ch) > { > int irq; > > - if ( (irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE)) < 0 ) > + if ( (irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE, false)) < 0 ) > return irq; > > ch->msi.irq = irq; > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > index 0ee3346..256dd02 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > @@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ void __init clear_irq_vector(int irq) > /* > * Dynamic irq allocate and deallocation for MSI > */ > -int create_irq(nodeid_t node) > + Extra newline. > +int create_irq(nodeid_t node, bool grant_access) > { > int irq, ret; > struct irq_desc *desc; > @@ -282,18 +283,23 @@ int create_irq(nodeid_t node) > } > ret = assign_irq_vector(irq, mask); > } > + > + ASSERT(desc->arch.creator_domid == DOMID_INVALID); > + > if (ret < 0) > { > desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED; > irq = ret; > } > - else if ( hardware_domain ) > + else if ( grant_access ) > { > - ret = irq_permit_access(hardware_domain, irq); > + ret = irq_permit_access(current->domain, irq); > if ( ret ) > printk(XENLOG_G_ERR > - "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n", > - irq, ret); > + "Could not grant %pd access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n", > + current->domain, irq, ret); > + else > + desc->arch.creator_domid = current->domain->domain_id; > } > > return irq; > @@ -307,14 +313,23 @@ void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq) > > BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq)); > > - if ( hardware_domain ) > + if ( desc->arch.creator_domid != DOMID_INVALID ) > { > - int err = irq_deny_access(hardware_domain, irq); > + struct domain *d = get_domain_by_id(desc->arch.creator_domid); > > - if ( err ) > - printk(XENLOG_G_ERR > - "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n", > - irq, err); > + if ( d ) > + { > + int err = irq_deny_access(d, irq); > + if ( err ) > + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR > + "Could not revoke %pd access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n", > + d, irq, err); > + } > + > + if ( d ) > + put_domain(d); You can place the put_domain inside the previous if AFAICT, since it's the same condition. > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h > index bc0c0c1..79853d0 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/irq.h > @@ -45,6 +45,11 @@ struct arch_irq_desc { > unsigned move_cleanup_count; > u8 move_in_progress : 1; > s8 used; > + /* > + * Weak reference to domain having permission over this IRQ (which > can > + * be different from the domain actually havint the IRQ assigned) ^ having > + */ > + domid_t creator_domid; > }; > > /* For use with irq_desc.arch.used */ > @@ -161,7 +166,7 @@ int init_irq_data(void); > void clear_irq_vector(int irq); > > int irq_to_vector(int irq); > -int create_irq(nodeid_t node); I would add: /* * If grant_access is set the current domain is given permissions over * the created IRQ. */ > +int create_irq(nodeid_t node, bool grant_access); > void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq); > int assign_irq_vector(int irq, const cpumask_t *); Thanks, Roger. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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