[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v10] x86/emulate: Send vm_event from emulate
On 18.09.2019 12:47, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 17.09.2019 17:09, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: >> On Tue, Sep 17, 2019 at 8:24 AM Razvan Cojocaru >> <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>> On 9/17/19 5:11 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote: >>>>>>>> +bool hvm_monitor_check_p2m(unsigned long gla, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t >>>>>>>> pfec, >>>>>>>> + uint16_t kind) >>>>>>>> +{ >>>>>>>> + xenmem_access_t access; >>>>>>>> + vm_event_request_t req = {}; >>>>>>>> + paddr_t gpa = (gfn_to_gaddr(gfn) | (gla & ~PAGE_MASK)); >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> + ASSERT(current->arch.vm_event->send_event); >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> + current->arch.vm_event->send_event = false; >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> + if ( p2m_get_mem_access(current->domain, gfn, &access, >>>>>>>> + altp2m_vcpu_idx(current)) != 0 ) >>>>>>>> + return false; >>>>>>> ... next to the call here (but the maintainers of the file would >>>>>>> have to judge in the end). That said, I continue to not understand >>>>>>> why a not found entry means unrestricted access. Isn't it >>>>>>> ->default_access which controls what such a "virtual" entry would >>>>>>> permit? >>>>>> I'm sorry for this misleading comment. The code states that if entry was >>>>>> not found the access will be default_access and return 0. So in this >>>>>> case the default_access will be checked. >>>>>> >>>>>> /* If request to get default access. */ >>>>>> if ( gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN) ) >>>>>> { >>>>>> *access = memaccess[p2m->default_access]; >>>>>> return 0; >>>>>> } >>>>>> >>>>>> If this clears thing up I can remove the "NOTE" part if the comment. >>>>> I'm afraid it doesn't clear things up: I'm still lost as to why >>>>> "entry not found" implies "full access". And I'm further lost as >>>>> to what the code fragment above (dealing with INVALID_GFN, but >>>>> not really the "entry not found" case, which would be INVALID_MFN >>>>> coming back from a translation) is supposed to tell me. >>>>> >>>> It is safe enough to consider a invalid mfn from hostp2 to be a >>>> violation. There is still a small problem with having the altp2m view >>>> not having the page propagated from hostp2m. In this case we have to use >>>> altp2m_get_effective_entry(). >>> >>> In the absence of clear guidance from the Intel SDM on what the hardware >>> default is for a page not present in the p2m, we should probably follow >>> Jan's advice and check violations against default_access for such pages. >> >> The SDM is very clear that pages that are not present in the EPT are a >> violation: >> >> 28.2.2 >> An EPT paging-structure entry is present if any of bits 2:0 is 1; >> otherwise, the entry is not present. The processor >> ignores bits 62:3 and uses the entry neither to reference another EPT >> paging-structure entry nor to produce a >> physical address. A reference using a guest-physical address whose >> translation encounters an EPT paging-struc- >> ture that is not present causes an EPT violation (see Section 28.2.3.2). >> >> 28.2.3.2 >> EPT Violations >> An EPT violation may occur during an access using a guest-physical >> address whose translation does not cause an >> EPT misconfiguration. An EPT violation occurs in any of the following >> situations: >> • Translation of the guest-physical address encounters an EPT >> paging-structure entry that is not present (see >> Section 28.2.2). > > I'm not sure if / how this helps (other than to answer Razvan's > immediate question): It was for a reason that I talked about > "virtual" entries, e.g. ones that would be there if they had > been propagated already. Albeit propagated ones probably aren't > a good case here, since those don't have default_access > permissions anyway. > > But anyway - what my original remark here was about was the > (missing) distinction of the different failure modes of > p2m_get_mem_access(). For example I'd expect a GFN mapping > to physical memory access to which is emulated to go the > -ESRCH return path, due to INVALID_MFN coming back. Yet such > GFNs still ought to have access controls (at least in theory). > I agree with this and I think they should be treated as XENMEM_access_n. If everyone is OK with this I will add a -ESRCH path that uses XENMEM_access_n as access. Alex _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |