[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v10] x86/emulate: Send vm_event from emulate
On 17.09.2019 17:09, Tamas K Lengyel wrote: > On Tue, Sep 17, 2019 at 8:24 AM Razvan Cojocaru > <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> On 9/17/19 5:11 PM, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote: >>>>>>> +bool hvm_monitor_check_p2m(unsigned long gla, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t pfec, >>>>>>> + uint16_t kind) >>>>>>> +{ >>>>>>> + xenmem_access_t access; >>>>>>> + vm_event_request_t req = {}; >>>>>>> + paddr_t gpa = (gfn_to_gaddr(gfn) | (gla & ~PAGE_MASK)); >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + ASSERT(current->arch.vm_event->send_event); >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + current->arch.vm_event->send_event = false; >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + if ( p2m_get_mem_access(current->domain, gfn, &access, >>>>>>> + altp2m_vcpu_idx(current)) != 0 ) >>>>>>> + return false; >>>>>> ... next to the call here (but the maintainers of the file would >>>>>> have to judge in the end). That said, I continue to not understand >>>>>> why a not found entry means unrestricted access. Isn't it >>>>>> ->default_access which controls what such a "virtual" entry would >>>>>> permit? >>>>> I'm sorry for this misleading comment. The code states that if entry was >>>>> not found the access will be default_access and return 0. So in this >>>>> case the default_access will be checked. >>>>> >>>>> /* If request to get default access. */ >>>>> if ( gfn_eq(gfn, INVALID_GFN) ) >>>>> { >>>>> *access = memaccess[p2m->default_access]; >>>>> return 0; >>>>> } >>>>> >>>>> If this clears thing up I can remove the "NOTE" part if the comment. >>>> I'm afraid it doesn't clear things up: I'm still lost as to why >>>> "entry not found" implies "full access". And I'm further lost as >>>> to what the code fragment above (dealing with INVALID_GFN, but >>>> not really the "entry not found" case, which would be INVALID_MFN >>>> coming back from a translation) is supposed to tell me. >>>> >>> It is safe enough to consider a invalid mfn from hostp2 to be a >>> violation. There is still a small problem with having the altp2m view >>> not having the page propagated from hostp2m. In this case we have to use >>> altp2m_get_effective_entry(). >> >> In the absence of clear guidance from the Intel SDM on what the hardware >> default is for a page not present in the p2m, we should probably follow >> Jan's advice and check violations against default_access for such pages. > > The SDM is very clear that pages that are not present in the EPT are a > violation: > > 28.2.2 > An EPT paging-structure entry is present if any of bits 2:0 is 1; > otherwise, the entry is not present. The processor > ignores bits 62:3 and uses the entry neither to reference another EPT > paging-structure entry nor to produce a > physical address. A reference using a guest-physical address whose > translation encounters an EPT paging-struc- > ture that is not present causes an EPT violation (see Section 28.2.3.2). > > 28.2.3.2 > EPT Violations > An EPT violation may occur during an access using a guest-physical > address whose translation does not cause an > EPT misconfiguration. An EPT violation occurs in any of the following > situations: > • Translation of the guest-physical address encounters an EPT > paging-structure entry that is not present (see > Section 28.2.2). I'm not sure if / how this helps (other than to answer Razvan's immediate question): It was for a reason that I talked about "virtual" entries, e.g. ones that would be there if they had been propagated already. Albeit propagated ones probably aren't a good case here, since those don't have default_access permissions anyway. But anyway - what my original remark here was about was the (missing) distinction of the different failure modes of p2m_get_mem_access(). For example I'd expect a GFN mapping to physical memory access to which is emulated to go the -ESRCH return path, due to INVALID_MFN coming back. Yet such GFNs still ought to have access controls (at least in theory). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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