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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 3/4] adjust special domain creation (and call it earlier on x86)
>>> On 04.06.19 at 15:35, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 04/06/2019 13:43, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Split out this mostly arch-independent code into a common-code helper
>> function. (This does away with Arm's arch_init_memory() altogether.)
>>
>> On x86 this needs to happen before acpi_boot_init(): Commit 9fa94e1058
>> ("x86/ACPI: also parse AMD IOMMU tables early") only appeared to work
>> fine - it's really broken, and doesn't crash (on non-EFI AMD systems)
>> only because of there being a mapping of linear address 0 during early
>> boot. On EFI there is:
>>
>> Early fatal page fault at e008:ffff82d08024d58e (cr2=0000000000000220,
>> ec=0000)
>> ----[ Xen-4.13-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
>> CPU: 0
>> RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08024d58e>] pci.c#_pci_hide_device+0x17/0x3a
>> RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor
>> rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000006000 rcx: 0000000000000000
>> rdx: ffff83104f2ee9b0 rsi: ffff82e0209e5d48 rdi: ffff83104f2ee9a0
>> rbp: ffff82d08081fce0 rsp: ffff82d08081fcb8 r8: 0000000000000000
>> r9: 8000000000000000 r10: 0180000000000000 r11: 7fffffffffffffff
>> r12: ffff83104f2ee9a0 r13: 0000000000000002 r14: ffff83104f2ee4b0
>> r15: 0000000000000064 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000000a0
>> cr3: 000000009f614000 cr2: 0000000000000220
>> fsb: 0000000000000000 gsb: 0000000000000000 gss: 0000000000000000
>> ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: 0000 cs: e008
>> Xen code around <ffff82d08024d58e> (pci.c#_pci_hide_device+0x17/0x3a):
>> 48 89 47 38 48 8d 57 10 <48> 8b 88 20 02 00 00 48 89 51 08 48 89 4f 10 48
>> Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d08081fcb8:
>> [...]
>> Xen call trace:
>> [<ffff82d08024d58e>] pci.c#_pci_hide_device+0x17/0x3a
>> [ [< >] pci_ro_device+...]
>
> What is this in the stack trace?
The entry missing here, to make the whole thing sensible. See
the other patch I did send ("x86/traps: widen condition for
logging top-of-stack").
>> [<ffff82d080617fe1>] amd_iommu_detect_one_acpi+0x161/0x249
>> [<ffff82d0806186ac>] iommu_acpi.c#detect_iommu_acpi+0xb5/0xe7
>> [<ffff82d08061cde0>] acpi_table_parse+0x61/0x90
>> [<ffff82d080619e7d>] amd_iommu_detect_acpi+0x17/0x19
>> [<ffff82d08061790b>] acpi_ivrs_init+0x20/0x5b
>> [<ffff82d08062e838>] acpi_boot_init+0x301/0x30f
>> [<ffff82d080628b10>] __start_xen+0x1daf/0x28a2
>>
>> Pagetable walk from 0000000000000220:
>> L4[0x000] = 000000009f44f063 ffffffffffffffff
>> L3[0x000] = 000000009f44b063 ffffffffffffffff
>> L2[0x000] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff
>>
>> ****************************************
>> Panic on CPU 0:
>> FATAL TRAP: vector = 14 (page fault)
>> [error_code=0000] , IN INTERRUPT CONTEXT
>> ****************************************
>>
>> Of course the bug would nevertheless have lead to post-boot crashes as
>> soon as the list would actually get traversed.
>>
>> Take the opportunity and
>> - convert BUG_ON()s being moved to panic(),
>> - add __read_mostly annotations to the dom_* definitions.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>
> Sorry for not noticing this before, but s/special/system/ to match up
> with the existing terminology in is_system_domain()
Easily done.
>> --- a/xen/include/xen/mm.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/xen/mm.h
>> @@ -642,6 +642,9 @@ static inline void filtered_flush_tlb_ma
>> }
>> }
>>
>> +/* Private domain structs for DOMID_XEN, DOMID_IO, etc. */
>> +extern struct domain *dom_xen, *dom_io, *dom_cow;
>> +
>
> Any chance you can move these higher up, to before the include of
> <asm/mm.h>, or you're going to break Julien's M2P series.
Hmm, I could, albeit I did intentionally place them there. In fact I
had them elsewhere first, until the build broke because of the use
of dom_xen in share_xen_page_with_privileged_guests(). That's
what made me decide to put it where it now is (and I'd prefer to
keep it there for now).
> With at least the name adjusted, Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper
> <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks.
Jan
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