[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v7 1/9] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses
>>> On 21.02.19 at 09:16, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > @@ -813,6 +817,7 @@ int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t > virq) > > if (virq >= NR_VIRQS) > return -EINVAL; > + > if (!virq_is_global(virq)) > return -EINVAL; > Stray (but benign) change. Easy enough to take out while committing. Without this: Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Btw, it would have been nice if you had also dropped the somewhat misleading SpectreV1 from the subject line tags of the series. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |