[Xen-devel] SpectreV1+L1TF Patch Series v7

[Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>]

Dear all,

This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html), namely to avoid
touching memory from the hypervisor speculatively that would not be touched
without speculation. To block speculative execution on Intel hardware, an
lfence instruction is required to make sure that selected checks are not
bypassed. Speculative out-of-bound accesses can be prevented by using the
array_index_nospec macro.

The major changes between v6 and v7 of this series are preferring the lfence
instruction to block speculation over updating variables. Furthermore, when
patching in the lfence instruction automatically, the setting of smt and l1d
flushing are taken into account.

Best,
Norbert




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