[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/dom0: prevent access to MMCFG areas for PVH Dom0
>>> On 25.08.17 at 14:15, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 02:16:38AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >>> On 22.08.17 at 15:54, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 06:26:23AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >> >>> On 11.08.17 at 18:43, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c >> >> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c >> >> > @@ -440,6 +440,10 @@ int __init dom0_setup_permissions(struct domain *d) >> >> > rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn); >> >> > } >> >> > >> >> > + /* For PVH prevent access to the MMCFG areas. */ >> >> > + if ( dom0_pvh ) >> >> > + rc |= pci_mmcfg_set_domain_permissions(d); >> >> >> >> What about ones reported by Dom0 later on? Which then raises the >> >> question whether ... >> > >> > This should be dealt with in the PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved handler. >> > But since you propose to do white listing, I guess it doesn't matter >> > that much anymore. >> >> Well, a fundamental question is whether white listing would work in >> the first place. I could see room for severe problems e.g. with ACPI >> methods wanting to access MMIO that's not described by any PCI >> devices' BARs. Typically that would be regions in the chipset which >> firmware is responsible for configuring/managing, the addresses of >> which can be found/set in custom config space registers. > > The question would also be what would Xen allow in such white-listing. > Obviously you can get to map the same using both white-list and > black-listing (see below). Not really - what you've said there regarding MMCFG regions is a clear indication that we should _not_ map reserved regions, i.e. it would need to be full white listing with perhaps just the PCI device BARs being handled automatically. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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