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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/dom0: prevent access to MMCFG areas for PVH Dom0
>>> On 11.08.17 at 18:43, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> They are emulated by Xen, so they must not be mapped into Dom0 p2m.
> Introduce a helper function to add the MMCFG areas to the list of
> denied iomem regions for PVH Dom0.
"They are" or "They are going to be"?
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/dom0_build.c
> @@ -440,6 +440,10 @@ int __init dom0_setup_permissions(struct domain *d)
> rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn);
> }
>
> + /* For PVH prevent access to the MMCFG areas. */
> + if ( dom0_pvh )
> + rc |= pci_mmcfg_set_domain_permissions(d);
What about ones reported by Dom0 later on? Which then raises the
question whether ...
> @@ -175,6 +177,25 @@ void pci_mmcfg_arch_disable(unsigned int idx)
> cfg->pci_segment, cfg->start_bus_number, cfg->end_bus_number);
> }
>
> +int pci_mmcfg_set_domain_permissions(struct domain *d)
> +{
> + unsigned int idx;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + for ( idx = 0; idx < pci_mmcfg_config_num; idx++ )
> + {
> + const struct acpi_mcfg_allocation *cfg = pci_mmcfg_virt[idx].cfg;
> + unsigned long start = PFN_DOWN(cfg->address) +
> + PCI_BDF(cfg->start_bus_number, 0, 0);
> + unsigned long end = PFN_DOWN(cfg->address) +
> + PCI_BDF(cfg->end_bus_number, ~0, ~0);
> +
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, start, end);
... this shouldn't be unnecessary by, other than PV Dom0,
starting out with no I/O memory being made accessible (i.e.
white listing just like we decided we would do for other
properties for PVH).
Additionally while in the code that dom0_setup_permissions()
was broken out from using |= was fine, there and here it's not
really appropriate unless we want to continue to bake in the
assumption that either iomem_deny_access() can only ever
return a single error indicator or (b) the callers only care about
the value being (non-)zero.
Jan
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