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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC] DOMCTL_memattrs_op : a new DOMCTL to play with stage-2 page attributes

>>> On 05.07.17 at 22:39, <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 05/07/2017 19:35, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>> On Tue, 4 Jul 2017, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> For one, we could remove the CONFIG_HAS_MEM_ACCESS around
>>> them if a broader use is planned. And in general we should try to
>>> avoid having two ways of doing the same thing, unless backwards
>>> compatibility makes this a requirement. Hence if a new, better way
>>> is to be introduced, the old one should at once go away. Finally, I'm
>>> still unconvinced a new DOMCTL_* is better here than a (tool stack
>>> only) XENMEM_*, but I agree the boundary between when to use
>>> what is at best fuzzy.
>> Do we maintain ABI compatibility for XENMEM_* hypercalls? I think we do,
>> don't we? Also, XENMEM_* hypercalls are usually available to both
>> guests and toolstack, right?
>> We don't want two ways of doing the same thing, but at the same time
>> XENMEM_ hypercalls are very different from DOMCTLs, which don't come
>> with any ABI compatibility guarantees and are only available to the
>> toolstack. And these two specific XENMEM hypercalls even depend on
>> I am not completely sure about what the best way forward would be. I am
>> OK with anything that is clear and maintainable. I would probably still
>> go with updating DOMCTL_pin_mem_cacheattr into something that can handle
>> both ARM and permissions, but I am also OK with making changes to
>> XENMEM_access_op_{set,get}_access so that they become an option for this
>> use case.
> I am struggling to understand how you could make memaccess_op_*_access 
> supporting 2 distinct use cases. They are currently used to instrospect 
> memory by restricting the permission. All the faults will be forwarded 
> to a monitor.

There's nothing memaccess-specific in the handler of the operation.
Where faults go merely depends on whether a monitor has been
registered afaict. Hence ...

> Here you suggest to extend them to restrict permission. But we want to 
> be able to support introspection on that share page (I don't see why 
> not) and we don't want to have to set-up a VM-event ring just for 
> restrict the page.
> Moreover, you would have to store the access permission for the 
> time-being... whilst here you just modify the permission of the page for 
> good.

... no matter which way we allow setting the permissions for the
purpose here, we'll have to deal with what you describe, except
that as per above the question of setting up a ring looks orthogonal
to the apparent conflicts here.

Considering the intended purpose here (as far as I recall it), was it
already taken into consideration to request suitable attributes right
at the time the page gets installed into the physmap? Iirc there's no
need to actually "play" with the attributes at random times.


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