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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/HVM: don't leak PFEC_implict to guests



On 04/06/2017 11:11 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 06.04.17 at 16:59, <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
>>> @@ -269,13 +269,23 @@ static int svm_vmcb_restore(struct vcpu
>>>      struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = v->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
>>>      struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain);
>>>  
>>> -    if ( c->pending_valid &&
>>> -         ((c->pending_type == 1) || (c->pending_type > 6) ||
>>> -          (c->pending_reserved != 0)) )
>>> +    if ( c->pending_valid )
>>>      {
>>> -        gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Invalid pending event %#"PRIx32".\n",
>>> -                 c->pending_event);
>>> -        return -EINVAL;
>>> +       if ( (c->pending_type == 1) || (c->pending_type > 6) ||
>> Shouldn't this be >=5? The only valid types are 0, 2, 3 and 4.
> I don't know, I'm only moving this code. Changes to the values
> should be a separate patch.

Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>

I can send a patch to adjust type check once this is committed to
staging unless you want to do it yourself.

-boris


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