[Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 212 (CVE-2017-7228) - x86: broken check in memory_exchange() permits PV guest breakout

[Xen.org security team <security@xxxxxxx>]

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            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-7228 / XSA-212
                              version 3

       x86: broken check in memory_exchange() permits PV guest breakout

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

The XSA-29 fix introduced an insufficient check on XENMEM_exchange
input, allowing the caller to drive hypervisor memory accesses outside
of the guest provided input/output arrays.

IMPACT
======

A malicious or buggy 64-bit PV guest may be able to access all of
system memory, allowing for all of privilege escalation, host crashes,
and information leaks.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All Xen versions are vulnerable.

Only x86 systems are affected.  ARM systems are not vulnerable.

The vulnerability is only exposed to 64-bit PV guests.  HVM guests and
32-bit PV guests can't exploit the vulnerability.

MITIGATION
==========

Running only HVM or 32-bit PV guests will avoid the vulnerability.

The vulnerability can be avoided if the guest kernel is controlled by
the host rather than guest administrator, provided that further steps
are taken to prevent the guest administrator from loading code into
the kernel (e.g. by disabling loadable modules etc) or from using
other mechanisms which allow them to run code at kernel privilege.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the attached patch resolves this issue.

xsa212.patch           xen-unstable, Xen 4.8.x, Xen 4.7.x, Xen 4.6.x, Xen 
4.5.x, Xen 4.4.x

$ sha256sum xsa212*
be1255bcda06158cdb86eb5297e8a271e05318e88cd21035c58a67f9ada6ccba  xsa212.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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Attachment: xsa212.patch
Description: Binary data

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