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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 21/30] x86/pv: Provide custom cpumasks for PV domains
>>> On 05.02.16 at 14:42, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ static void __init noinline probe_masking_msrs(void)
> static void amd_ctxt_switch_levelling(const struct domain *nextd)
> {
> struct cpuidmasks *these_masks = &this_cpu(cpuidmasks);
> - const struct cpuidmasks *masks = &cpuidmask_defaults;
> + const struct cpuidmasks *masks =
> + (nextd && is_pv_domain(nextd) &&
> nextd->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks)
> + ? nextd->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks : &cpuidmask_defaults;
Mixing tabs and spaces for indentation.
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
> @@ -574,6 +574,11 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d, unsigned int
> domcr_flags,
> goto fail;
> clear_page(d->arch.pv_domain.gdt_ldt_l1tab);
>
> + d->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks = xmalloc(struct cpuidmasks);
> + if ( !d->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks )
> + goto fail;
> + *d->arch.pv_domain.cpuidmasks = cpuidmask_defaults;
Along the lines of not masking features for the hypervisor's own use
(see the respective comment on the earlier patch) I think this patch,
here or in domain_build.c, should except Dom0 from having the
default masking applied. This shouldn't, however, extend to CPUID
faulting. (Perhaps this rather belongs here so that the non-Dom0
hardware domain case can also be taken care of.)
Jan
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