[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of userspace hypercalls
On Tue, 12 Jan 2016, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> On 12.01.16 at 13:07, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, 11 Jan 2016, David Vrabel wrote: > >> On 11/01/16 17:17, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >> > So from one point of view, sufficient justification for this change is > >> > "because the Linux way isn't the only valid way to do this". > >> > >> "Because we can" isn't a good justification for adding something new. > >> Particularly something that is trivially easy to (accidentally) misuse > >> and open a big security hole between userspace and kernel. > >> > >> The vague idea for a userspace netfront that's floating around > >> internally is also not a good reason for pushing this feature at this time. > > > > I agree with David, but I might have another good use case for this. > > > > Consider the following scenario: we have a Xen HVM guest, with Xen > > installed inside of it (nested virtualization). I'll refer to Xen > > running on the host as L0 Xen and Xen running inside the VM as L1 Xen. > > Similarly we have two dom0 running, the one with access to the physical > > hardware, L0 Dom0, and the one running inside the VM, L1 Dom0. > > > > Let's suppose that we want to lay the groundwork for L1 Dom0 to use PV > > frontend drivers, netfront and blkfront to speed up execution. In order > > to do that, the first thing it needs to do is making an hypercall to L0 > > Xen. That's because netfront and blkfront needs to communicate with > > netback and blkback in L0 Dom0: event channels and grant tables are the > > ones provided by L0 Xen. > > That's again a layering violation (bypassing the L1 hypervisor). True, but in this scenario it might be necessary for performance reasons: otherwise every hypercall would need to bounce off L1 Xen, possibly cancelling the benefits of running netfront and blkfront in the first place. I don't have numbers though. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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