[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of userspace hypercalls
>>> On 11.01.16 at 14:59, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Currently, hypercalls issued from HVM userspace will unconditionally fail > with -EPERM. > > This is inflexible, and a guest may wish to allow userspace to make > hypercalls. I thought previous discussion had made clear that routing these through ioctls or alike is the right approach, and hence the patch isn't needed. The more that an all-or-nothing approach seems pretty bold. > @@ -6839,6 +6840,28 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, > XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) > rc = do_altp2m_op(arg); > break; > > + case HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl: > + { > + xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t a; > + struct domain *d; > + > + if ( copy_from_guest(&a, arg, 1 ) ) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(a.domid, &d); > + if ( rc != 0 ) > + return rc; > + > + if ( current->domain != d ) > + return -EPERM; > + > + if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || a.dpl > 3 ) > + return -EINVAL; -EDOM perhaps for the right side? > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > index a8cc2ad..006a142 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h > @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct hvm_domain { > bool_t qemu_mapcache_invalidate; > bool_t is_s3_suspended; > > + uint32_t hypercall_dpl; uint8_t ? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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