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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Xen-unstable-staging: Xen BUG at iommu_map.c:455
On 11/04/15 18:25, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
> Saturday, April 11, 2015, 6:38:17 PM, you wrote:
>
>> On 11/04/15 17:32, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 11/04/15 17:21, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
>>>> Saturday, April 11, 2015, 4:21:56 PM, you wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 11/04/15 15:11, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
>>>>>> Friday, April 10, 2015, 8:55:27 PM, you wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10/04/15 11:24, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi Andrew,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Finally got some time to figure this out .. and i have narrowed it
>>>>>>>> down to:
>>>>>>>> git://xenbits.xen.org/staging/qemu-upstream-unstable.git
>>>>>>>> commit 7665d6ba98e20fb05c420de947c1750fd47e5c07 "Xen: Use the
>>>>>>>> ioreq-server API when available"
>>>>>>>> A straight revert of this commit prevents the issue from happening.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The reason i had a hard time figuring this out was:
>>>>>>>> - I wasn't aware of this earlier, since git pulling the main xen tree,
>>>>>>>> doesn't
>>>>>>>> auto update the qemu-* trees.
>>>>>>> This has caught me out so many times. It is very non-obvious behaviour.
>>>>>>>> - So i happen to get this when i cloned a fresh tree to try to figure
>>>>>>>> out the
>>>>>>>> other issue i was seeing.
>>>>>>>> - After that checking out previous versions of the main xen tree
>>>>>>>> didn't resolve
>>>>>>>> this new issue, because the qemu tree doesn't get auto updated and
>>>>>>>> is set
>>>>>>>> "master".
>>>>>>>> - Cloning a xen-stable-4.5.0 made it go away .. because that has a
>>>>>>>> specific
>>>>>>>> git://xenbits.xen.org/staging/qemu-upstream-unstable.git tag which
>>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>>> master.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *sigh*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is tested with xen main tree at last commit
>>>>>>>> 3a28f760508fb35c430edac17a9efde5aff6d1d5
>>>>>>>> (normal xen-unstable, not the staging branch)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ok so i have added some extra debug info (see attached diff) and this
>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>> output when it crashes due to something the commit above triggered,
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> level is out of bounds and the pfn looks fishy too.
>>>>>>>> Complete serial log from both bad and good (specific commit reverted)
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> attached.
>>>>>>> Just to confirm, you are positively identifying a qemu changeset as
>>>>>>> causing this crash?
>>>>>>> If so, the qemu change has discovered a pre-existing issue in the
>>>>>>> toolstack pci-passthrough interface. Whatever qemu is or isn't doing,
>>>>>>> it should not be able to cause a crash like this.
>>>>>>> With this in mind, I need to brush up on my AMD-Vi details.
>>>>>>> In the meantime, can you run with the following patch to identify what
>>>>>>> is going on, domctl wise? I assume it is the assign_device which is
>>>>>>> failing, but it will be nice to observe the differences between the
>>>>>>> working and failing case, which might offer a hint.
>>>>>> Hrrm with your patch i end up with a fatal page fault in
>>>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.833] ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y
>>>>>> Tainted: C ]----
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.857] CPU: 5
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.868] RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08014c52c>]
>>>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x2dc/0x740
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.894] RFLAGS: 0000000000010256 CONTEXT:
>>>>>> hypervisor
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.915] rax: 0000000000000008 rbx:
>>>>>> 0000000000000800 rcx: ffffffffffebe5ed
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.942] rdx: 0000000000000800 rsi:
>>>>>> 0000000000000000 rdi: ffff830256ef7e38
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.968] rbp: ffff830256ef7c98 rsp:
>>>>>> ffff830256ef7c08 r8: 00000000deadbeef
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.995] r9: 00000000deadbeef r10:
>>>>>> ffff82d08024e500 r11: 0000000000000282
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.022] r12: 0000000000000000 r13:
>>>>>> 0000000000000008 r14: 0000000000000000
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.049] r15: 0000000000000000 cr0:
>>>>>> 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000006f0
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.076] cr3: 00000002336a6000 cr2:
>>>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.096] ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs:
>>>>>> 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.121] Xen stack trace from
>>>>>> rsp=ffff830256ef7c08:
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.141] ffff830256ef7c78 ffff82d08012c178
>>>>>> ffff830256ef7c28 ffff830256ef7c28
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.168] 0000000000000010 0000000000000000
>>>>>> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.195] 00000000000006f0 00007fe300000000
>>>>>> ffff830256eb7790 ffff83025cc6d300
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.222] ffff82d080330c60 00007fe396bab004
>>>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396bab004
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.249] 0000000000000000 0000000000000005
>>>>>> ffff830256ef7ca8 ffff82d08014900b
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.276] ffff830256ef7d98 ffff82d080161f2d
>>>>>> 0000000000000010 0000000000000000
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.303] 0000000000000000 ffff830256ef7ce8
>>>>>> ffff82d08018b655 ffff830256ef7d48
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.330] ffff830256ef7cf8 ffff82d08018b66a
>>>>>> ffff830256ef7d38 ffff82d08012925e
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.357] ffff830256efc068 0000000800000001
>>>>>> 800000022e12c167 0000000000000000
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.384] 0000000000000002 ffff830256ef7e38
>>>>>> 0000000800000000 800000022e12c167
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.411] 0000000000000003 ffff830256ef7db8
>>>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396780eb0
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.439] 0000000000000202 ffffffffffffffff
>>>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396bab004
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.466] 0000000000000000 0000000000000005
>>>>>> ffff830256ef7ef8 ffff82d08010497f
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.493] 0000000000000001 0000000000100001
>>>>>> 800000022e12c167 ffff88001f7ecc00
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.520] 00007fe396780eb0 ffff88001c849508
>>>>>> 0000000e00000007 ffffffff8105594a
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.547] 000000000000e033 0000000000000202
>>>>>> ffff88001ece3d40 000000000000e02b
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.574] ffff830256ef7e28 ffff82d080194933
>>>>>> 000000000000beef ffffffff81bd6c85
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.601] ffff830256ef7f08 ffff82d080193edd
>>>>>> 0000000b0000002d 0000000000000001
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.628] 0000000100000800 00007fe3962abbd0
>>>>>> ffff000a81050001 00007fe39656ce6e
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.655] 00007ffdf2a654f0 00007fe39656d0c9
>>>>>> 00007fe39656ce6e 00007fe3969a9a55
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.682] Xen call trace:
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.695] [<ffff82d08014c52c>]
>>>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x2dc/0x740
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.718] [<ffff82d08014900b>]
>>>>>> iommu_do_domctl+0x17/0x1a
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.739] [<ffff82d080161f2d>]
>>>>>> arch_do_domctl+0x2469/0x26e1
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.762] [<ffff82d08010497f>]
>>>>>> do_domctl+0x1a1f/0x1d60
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.783] [<ffff82d080234c6b>]
>>>>>> syscall_enter+0xeb/0x145
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.804]
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.813] Pagetable walk from 0000000000000000:
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.831] L4[0x000] = 0000000234075067
>>>>>> 000000000001f2a8
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.852] L3[0x000] = 0000000229ad4067
>>>>>> 0000000000014c49
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.873] L2[0x000] = 0000000000000000
>>>>>> ffffffffffffffff
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.894]
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.903] ****************************************
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.922] Panic on CPU 5:
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.935] FATAL PAGE FAULT
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.948] [error_code=0000]
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.961] Faulting linear address: 0000000000000000
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.981] ****************************************
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:33.000]
>>>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:33.009] Reboot in five seconds...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The RIP resolves to the prink added by your patch in:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
>>>>>> ret = xsm_test_assign_device(XSM_HOOK,
>>>>>> domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf);
>>>>>> if ( ret )
>>>>>> break;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> seg = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 16;
>>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> printk("*** %pv->d%d: test_assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>>>>> current, d->domain_id,
>>>>>> seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>>>
>>>>>> if ( device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) )
>>>>>> {
>>>>>> printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
>>>>>> "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u already assigned, or
>>>>>> non-existent\n",
>>>>>> seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>>> ret = -EINVAL;
>>>>>> }
>>>>>> break;
>>>>> hmm - 'd' is NULL. This ought to work better.
>>>>> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
>>>>> index 9f3413c..85ff1fc 100644
>>>>> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
>>>>> @@ -1532,6 +1532,11 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>>> max_sdevs = domctl->u.get_device_group.max_sdevs;
>>>>> sdevs = domctl->u.get_device_group.sdev_array;
>>>>>
>>>>> + printk("*** %pv->d%d: get_device_group({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u,
>>>>> %u})\n",
>>>>> + current, d->domain_id,
>>>>> + seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
>>>>> + max_sdevs);
>>>>> +
>>>>> ret = iommu_get_device_group(d, seg, bus, devfn, sdevs,
>>>>> max_sdevs);
>>>>> if ( ret < 0 )
>>>>> {
>>>>> @@ -1558,6 +1563,9 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>>>
>>>>> + printk("*** %pv: test_assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>>>> + current, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>> +
>>>>> if ( device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) )
>>>>> {
>>>>> printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
>>>>> @@ -1582,6 +1590,10 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>>>
>>>>> + printk("*** %pv->d%d: assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>>>> + current, d->domain_id,
>>>>> + seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>> +
>>>>> ret = device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) ?:
>>>>> assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn);
>>>>> if ( ret == -ERESTART )
>>>>> @@ -1604,6 +1616,10 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>>> bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>>> devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>>>
>>>>> + printk("*** %pv->d%d: deassign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>>>> + current, d->domain_id,
>>>>> + seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>> +
>>>>> spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
>>>>> ret = deassign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn);
>>>>> spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
>>>> Hi Andrew,
>>>>
>>>> Attached are the serial logs good (with revert) and bad (without):
>>>>
>>>> Some things that seems strange to me:
>>>> - The numerous calls to get the device 08:00.0 assigned ... for 0a:00.0
>>>> there
>>>> was only one call to both test assign and assign.
>>>> - However these numerous calls are there in both the good and the bad case,
>>>> so perhaps it's strange and wrong .. but not the cause ..
>>>> - I had a hunch it could be due to the 08:00.0 using MSI-X, but when only
>>>> passing through 0a:00.0, i get the same numerous calls but now for the
>>>> 0a:00.0 which uses IntX, so I think that is more related to being the
>>>> *first*
>>>> device to be passed through to a guest.
>>> I have also observed this behaviour, but not had time to investigate.
>>> It doesn't appear problematic in the longrun but it probably a toolstack
>>> issue which wants fixing (if only in the name of efficiency).
>> And just after I sent this email, I have realised why.
>> The first assign device will have to build IO pagetables, which is a
>> long operation and subject to hypercall continuations. The second
>> device will reused the same pagetables, so is quick to complete.
> So .. is the ioreq patch from Paul involved in providing something used in
> building
> the pagetables .. and could it have say some off by one resulting in the
> 0xffffffffffff .. which could lead to the pagetable building going beserk,
> requiring a paging_mode far greater than normally would be required .. which
> get's set .. since that isn't checked properly .. leading to things breaking
> a bit further when it does get checked ?
A -1 is slipping in somewhere and ending up in the gfn field.
The result is that update_paging_mode() attempts to construct
iopagetables to cover a 76bit address space, which is how level ends up
at 8. (Note that a level of 7 is reserved, and a level of anything
greater than 4 is implausible on your system.)
I think the crash is collateral damage following on from
update_paging_mode() not properly sanitising its input, but that there
is still some other issue causing -1 to be passed in the first place.
I am still trying to locate where a -1 might plausibly be coming from.
~Andrew
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