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Re: [Xen-devel] Xen-unstable-staging: Xen BUG at iommu_map.c:455



On 11/04/15 17:32, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 11/04/15 17:21, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
>> Saturday, April 11, 2015, 4:21:56 PM, you wrote:
>>
>>> On 11/04/15 15:11, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
>>>> Friday, April 10, 2015, 8:55:27 PM, you wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 10/04/15 11:24, Sander Eikelenboom wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Andrew,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Finally got some time to figure this out .. and i have narrowed it down 
>>>>>> to:
>>>>>> git://xenbits.xen.org/staging/qemu-upstream-unstable.git
>>>>>> commit 7665d6ba98e20fb05c420de947c1750fd47e5c07 "Xen: Use the 
>>>>>> ioreq-server API when available"
>>>>>> A straight revert of this commit prevents the issue from happening.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The reason i had a hard time figuring this out was:
>>>>>> - I wasn't aware of this earlier, since git pulling the main xen tree, 
>>>>>> doesn't 
>>>>>>   auto update the qemu-* trees.
>>>>> This has caught me out so many times.  It is very non-obvious behaviour.
>>>>>> - So i happen to get this when i cloned a fresh tree to try to figure 
>>>>>> out the 
>>>>>>   other issue i was seeing.
>>>>>> - After that checking out previous versions of the main xen tree didn't 
>>>>>> resolve 
>>>>>>   this new issue, because the qemu tree doesn't get auto updated and is 
>>>>>> set 
>>>>>>   "master".
>>>>>> - Cloning a xen-stable-4.5.0 made it go away .. because that has a 
>>>>>> specific 
>>>>>>   git://xenbits.xen.org/staging/qemu-upstream-unstable.git tag which is 
>>>>>> not 
>>>>>>   master.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *sigh* 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is tested with xen main tree at last commit 
>>>>>> 3a28f760508fb35c430edac17a9efde5aff6d1d5
>>>>>> (normal xen-unstable, not the staging branch)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ok so i have added some extra debug info (see attached diff) and this is 
>>>>>> the 
>>>>>> output when it crashes due to something the commit above triggered, the 
>>>>>> level is out of bounds and the pfn looks fishy too.
>>>>>> Complete serial log from both bad and good (specific commit reverted) 
>>>>>> are 
>>>>>> attached.
>>>>> Just to confirm, you are positively identifying a qemu changeset as
>>>>> causing this crash?
>>>>> If so, the qemu change has discovered a pre-existing issue in the
>>>>> toolstack pci-passthrough interface.  Whatever qemu is or isn't doing,
>>>>> it should not be able to cause a crash like this.
>>>>> With this in mind, I need to brush up on my AMD-Vi details.
>>>>> In the meantime, can you run with the following patch to identify what
>>>>> is going on, domctl wise?  I assume it is the assign_device which is
>>>>> failing, but it will be nice to observe the differences between the
>>>>> working and failing case, which might offer a hint.
>>>> Hrrm with your patch i end up with a fatal page fault in 
>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl:
>>>>
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.833] ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable  x86_64  debug=y  
>>>> Tainted:    C ]----
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.857] CPU:    5
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.868] RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d08014c52c>] 
>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x2dc/0x740
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.894] RFLAGS: 0000000000010256   CONTEXT: 
>>>> hypervisor
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.915] rax: 0000000000000008   rbx: 
>>>> 0000000000000800   rcx: ffffffffffebe5ed
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.942] rdx: 0000000000000800   rsi: 
>>>> 0000000000000000   rdi: ffff830256ef7e38
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.968] rbp: ffff830256ef7c98   rsp: 
>>>> ffff830256ef7c08   r8:  00000000deadbeef
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:31.995] r9:  00000000deadbeef   r10: 
>>>> ffff82d08024e500   r11: 0000000000000282
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.022] r12: 0000000000000000   r13: 
>>>> 0000000000000008   r14: 0000000000000000
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.049] r15: 0000000000000000   cr0: 
>>>> 0000000080050033   cr4: 00000000000006f0
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.076] cr3: 00000002336a6000   cr2: 
>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.096] ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000  
>>>>  ss: e010   cs: e008
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.121] Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff830256ef7c08:
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.141]    ffff830256ef7c78 ffff82d08012c178 
>>>> ffff830256ef7c28 ffff830256ef7c28
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.168]    0000000000000010 0000000000000000 
>>>> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.195]    00000000000006f0 00007fe300000000 
>>>> ffff830256eb7790 ffff83025cc6d300
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.222]    ffff82d080330c60 00007fe396bab004 
>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396bab004
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.249]    0000000000000000 0000000000000005 
>>>> ffff830256ef7ca8 ffff82d08014900b
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.276]    ffff830256ef7d98 ffff82d080161f2d 
>>>> 0000000000000010 0000000000000000
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.303]    0000000000000000 ffff830256ef7ce8 
>>>> ffff82d08018b655 ffff830256ef7d48
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.330]    ffff830256ef7cf8 ffff82d08018b66a 
>>>> ffff830256ef7d38 ffff82d08012925e
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.357]    ffff830256efc068 0000000800000001 
>>>> 800000022e12c167 0000000000000000
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.384]    0000000000000002 ffff830256ef7e38 
>>>> 0000000800000000 800000022e12c167
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.411]    0000000000000003 ffff830256ef7db8 
>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396780eb0
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.439]    0000000000000202 ffffffffffffffff 
>>>> 0000000000000000 00007fe396bab004
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.466]    0000000000000000 0000000000000005 
>>>> ffff830256ef7ef8 ffff82d08010497f
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.493]    0000000000000001 0000000000100001 
>>>> 800000022e12c167 ffff88001f7ecc00
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.520]    00007fe396780eb0 ffff88001c849508 
>>>> 0000000e00000007 ffffffff8105594a
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.547]    000000000000e033 0000000000000202 
>>>> ffff88001ece3d40 000000000000e02b
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.574]    ffff830256ef7e28 ffff82d080194933 
>>>> 000000000000beef ffffffff81bd6c85
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.601]    ffff830256ef7f08 ffff82d080193edd 
>>>> 0000000b0000002d 0000000000000001
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.628]    0000000100000800 00007fe3962abbd0 
>>>> ffff000a81050001 00007fe39656ce6e
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.655]    00007ffdf2a654f0 00007fe39656d0c9 
>>>> 00007fe39656ce6e 00007fe3969a9a55
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.682] Xen call trace:
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.695]    [<ffff82d08014c52c>] 
>>>> iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x2dc/0x740
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.718]    [<ffff82d08014900b>] 
>>>> iommu_do_domctl+0x17/0x1a
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.739]    [<ffff82d080161f2d>] 
>>>> arch_do_domctl+0x2469/0x26e1
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.762]    [<ffff82d08010497f>] 
>>>> do_domctl+0x1a1f/0x1d60
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.783]    [<ffff82d080234c6b>] 
>>>> syscall_enter+0xeb/0x145
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.804] 
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.813] Pagetable walk from 0000000000000000:
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.831]  L4[0x000] = 0000000234075067 
>>>> 000000000001f2a8
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.852]  L3[0x000] = 0000000229ad4067 
>>>> 0000000000014c49
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.873]  L2[0x000] = 0000000000000000 
>>>> ffffffffffffffff 
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.894] 
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.903] ****************************************
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.922] Panic on CPU 5:
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.935] FATAL PAGE FAULT
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.948] [error_code=0000]
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.961] Faulting linear address: 0000000000000000
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:32.981] ****************************************
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:33.000] 
>>>> (XEN) [2015-04-11 14:03:33.009] Reboot in five seconds...
>>>>
>>>> The RIP resolves to the prink added by your patch in:
>>>>
>>>>     case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
>>>>         ret = xsm_test_assign_device(XSM_HOOK, 
>>>> domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf);
>>>>         if ( ret )
>>>>             break;
>>>>
>>>>         seg = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 16;
>>>>         bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>>         devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>>
>>>>         printk("*** %pv->d%d: test_assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>>>                current, d->domain_id,
>>>>                seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>
>>>>         if ( device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) )
>>>>         {
>>>>             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
>>>>                    "%04x:%02x:%02x.%u already assigned, or non-existent\n",
>>>>                    seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>>>             ret = -EINVAL;
>>>>         }
>>>>         break;
>>> hmm - 'd' is NULL.  This ought to work better.
>>> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
>>> index 9f3413c..85ff1fc 100644
>>> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
>>> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
>>> @@ -1532,6 +1532,11 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>          max_sdevs = domctl->u.get_device_group.max_sdevs;
>>>          sdevs = domctl->u.get_device_group.sdev_array;
>>>  
>>> +        printk("*** %pv->d%d: get_device_group({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u, %u})\n",
>>> +               current, d->domain_id,
>>> +               seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn),
>>> +               max_sdevs);
>>> +
>>>          ret = iommu_get_device_group(d, seg, bus, devfn, sdevs, max_sdevs);
>>>          if ( ret < 0 )
>>>          {
>>> @@ -1558,6 +1563,9 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>          bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>          devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>  
>>> +        printk("*** %pv: test_assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>> +               current, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>> +
>>>          if ( device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) )
>>>          {
>>>              printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
>>> @@ -1582,6 +1590,10 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>          bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>          devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>  
>>> +        printk("*** %pv->d%d: assign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>> +               current, d->domain_id,
>>> +               seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>> +
>>>          ret = device_assigned(seg, bus, devfn) ?:
>>>                assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn);
>>>          if ( ret == -ERESTART )
>>> @@ -1604,6 +1616,10 @@ int iommu_do_pci_domctl(
>>>          bus = (domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf >> 8) & 0xff;
>>>          devfn = domctl->u.assign_device.machine_sbdf & 0xff;
>>>  
>>> +        printk("*** %pv->d%d: deassign_device({%04x:%02x:%02x.%u})\n",
>>> +               current, d->domain_id,
>>> +               seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
>>> +
>>>          spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
>>>          ret = deassign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn);
>>>          spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
>> Hi Andrew,
>>
>> Attached are the serial logs good (with revert) and bad (without):
>>
>> Some things that seems strange to me:
>> - The numerous calls to get the device 08:00.0 assigned ... for 0a:00.0 
>> there 
>>   was only one call to both test assign and assign.
>> - However these numerous calls are there in both the good and the bad case,
>>   so perhaps it's strange and wrong .. but not the cause ..
>> - I had a hunch it could be due to the 08:00.0 using MSI-X, but when only 
>>   passing through 0a:00.0, i get the same numerous calls but now for the 
>>   0a:00.0 which uses IntX, so I think that is more related to being the 
>> *first*
>>   device to be passed through to a guest.
> I have also observed this behaviour, but not had time to investigate. 
> It doesn't appear problematic in the longrun but it probably a toolstack
> issue which wants fixing (if only in the name of efficiency).

And just after I sent this email, I have realised why.

The first assign device will have to build IO pagetables, which is a
long operation and subject to hypercall continuations.  The second
device will reused the same pagetables, so is quick to complete.

~Andrew

>
>> - On both the good and the bad case the "current" indicates more than one 
>> vpcu 
>>   was used, so that doesn't seem to be a pointer either.
> That is to be expected.  It will be whichever vcpu the toolstack process
> happened to be scheduled on at the point that it made the hypercall, and
> is liable to change at the whim of the dom0 scheduler.
>
>> - The bad log seems to indicate it crashes on or before hd->arch.paging_mode 
>> gets to 
>>   3.
>>
>> Is there anything useful to dump in update_paging_mode() when it updates the 
>> paging mode to the invalid value (8)? 
>> (and shouldn't that be denied in the first place ?) 
>>
>> To me that looks like the first indication that things are starting to go 
>> wrong.
> I would concur.  I am currently trying to develop another debugging
> patch, but to do that I also what to understand what I am debugging,
> which is why I have the AMD-Vi spec open :)
>
> ~Andrew
>
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