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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V4 08/13] xen: Introduce monitor_op domctl



On 02/09/2015 01:53 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
In preparation for allowing for introspecting ARM and PV domains the old
control interface via the hvm_op hypercall is retired. A new control mechanism
is introduced via the domctl hypercall: monitor_op.

This patch aims to establish a base API on which future applications can build
on.

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>

One minor typo, then:
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

[...]
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors 
b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index 9da3275..35d1c7b 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ class hvm
  # HVMOP_inject_trap
      hvmctl
  # XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required
+# XEN_DOMCLT_monitor_op
+# XEN_DOMCLT_vm_event_op
      vm_event
  # XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op and XENMEM_sharing_op_{share,add_physmap} with:
  #  source = the domain making the hypercall

DOMCLT => DOMCTL

--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency

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