[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] lock down hypercall continuation encoding masks
>>> On 05.12.14 at 15:36, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 05/12/14 11:31, Jan Beulich wrote: >> Andrew validly points out that even if these masks aren't a formal part >> of the hypercall interface, we aren't free to change them: A guest >> suspended for migration in the middle of a continuation would fail to >> work if resumed on a hypervisor using a different value. Hence add >> respective comments to their definitions. >> >> Additionally, to help future extensibility as well as in the spirit of >> reducing undefined behavior as much as possible, refuse hypercalls made >> with the respective bits non-zero when the respective sub-ops don't >> make use of those bits. >> >> Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > > General principle looks good. A couple of issues. > >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c >> @@ -4661,9 +4661,8 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one( >> long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) >> { >> int rc; >> - int op = cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK; > > This needs a blanket start_iter check, as do_memory_op() has not done so. Not sure what you're asking for - why is removing the masking not sufficient? > The ARM code also needs one, as the caller has applied partial checks. The ARM code never applied a mask. >> --- a/xen/common/memory.c >> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c >> @@ -977,6 +992,9 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN >> unsigned int dom_vnodes, dom_vranges, dom_vcpus; >> struct vnuma_info tmp; >> >> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) ) >> + return -ENOSYS; >> + >> /* >> * Guest passes nr_vnodes, number of regions and nr_vcpus thus >> * we know how much memory guest has allocated. > > XENMEM_get_vnumainfo needs a guard. Again - I don't understand what you're asking for: The hunk above is modifying the XENMEM_get_vnumainfo case. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |