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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] lock down hypercall continuation encoding masks
>>> On 05.12.14 at 15:36, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 05/12/14 11:31, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Andrew validly points out that even if these masks aren't a formal part
>> of the hypercall interface, we aren't free to change them: A guest
>> suspended for migration in the middle of a continuation would fail to
>> work if resumed on a hypervisor using a different value. Hence add
>> respective comments to their definitions.
>>
>> Additionally, to help future extensibility as well as in the spirit of
>> reducing undefined behavior as much as possible, refuse hypercalls made
>> with the respective bits non-zero when the respective sub-ops don't
>> make use of those bits.
>>
>> Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>
> General principle looks good. A couple of issues.
>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> @@ -4661,9 +4661,8 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one(
>> long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
>> {
>> int rc;
>> - int op = cmd & MEMOP_CMD_MASK;
>
> This needs a blanket start_iter check, as do_memory_op() has not done so.
Not sure what you're asking for - why is removing the masking not
sufficient?
> The ARM code also needs one, as the caller has applied partial checks.
The ARM code never applied a mask.
>> --- a/xen/common/memory.c
>> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c
>> @@ -977,6 +992,9 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN
>> unsigned int dom_vnodes, dom_vranges, dom_vcpus;
>> struct vnuma_info tmp;
>>
>> + if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
>> + return -ENOSYS;
>> +
>> /*
>> * Guest passes nr_vnodes, number of regions and nr_vcpus thus
>> * we know how much memory guest has allocated.
>
> XENMEM_get_vnumainfo needs a guard.
Again - I don't understand what you're asking for: The hunk above
is modifying the XENMEM_get_vnumainfo case.
Jan
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